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Abstract
In fault-tolerant quantum computing schemes, the overhead is often dominated by the cost
of preparing codewords reliably. This cost generally increases quadratically with the block size
of the underlying quantum error-correcting code. In consequence, large codes that are otherwise
very efficient have found limited fault-tolerance applications. Fault-tolerant preparation circuits
therefore are an important target for optimization.
We study the Golay code, a 23-qubit quantum error-correcting code that protects the logical
qubit to a distance of seven. In simulations, even using a na¨ıve ancilla preparation procedure,
the Golay code is competitive with other codes both in terms of overhead and the tolerable noise
threshold. We provide two simplified circuits for fault-tolerant preparation of Golay code-encoded
ancillas. The new circuits minimize error propagation, reducing the overhead by roughly a
factor of four compared to standard encoding circuits. By adapting the malignant set counting
technique to depolarizing noise, we further prove a threshold above 1.32× 10−3 noise per gate.
1 Introduction
A main obstacle to building a quantum computer is noise. A fault-tolerance threshold theorem
implies that reliable quantum computation is possible in principle [AB97, Kit97]. So long as the
noise is weak enough, the probability that a computation executes correctly can be made arbitrarily
close to one at the cost of increased circuit complexity, i.e., overhead. Fault-tolerant quantum circuit
constructions typically aim to maximize the tolerable noise rate while maintaining modest overhead.
A quantum fault-tolerance scheme generally works by encoding data into a quantum error-
correcting code and alternating steps of fault-tolerant computation and error correction (Figure 1).
The error-correction step, intended for recovery from accumulated noise, is normally much more
complicated than the computation step. Therefore error correction is the dominant factor in
determining the scheme’s resource overhead, and is usually the major bottleneck in determining the
highest tolerable noise rate or “noise threshold.” In particular, the details of how error correction is
implemented are more important than the properties of the underlying quantum error-correcting code.
For example, with the nine-qubit Bacon-Shor code, a fault-tolerant logical controlled-not (CNOT)
gate between two code blocks can be implemented using nine physical CNOT gates, whereas an
optimized error-correction method uses 24 physical CNOT gates [AC07]. For larger quantum
error-correcting codes, the asymmetry between computation and error correction is greater still.
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Figure 1: The circuit fragment above shows an example of alternating rounds of fault-tolerant error-
correction (EC) and computation. The wires represent encoded data blocks and the gate symbols (CNOT, H,
T) represent encoded operations.
With the 23-qubit Golay code, a fault-tolerant logical CNOT gate requires only 23 physical CNOT
gates, whereas a standard error-correction method uses 2400 physical CNOT gates.
Larger quantum error-correcting codes, with higher distance and possibly higher rates, can
still outperform smaller codes. Separate numerical studies by Steane [Ste03] (see also [Ste07]) and
Cross, DiVincenzo and Terhal [CDT09] have each compared fault-tolerance schemes based on a
variety of codes. They identify larger codes that, compared to the seven-qubit Steane code and the
nine-qubit Bacon-Shor code, can tolerate higher noise rates with comparable resource requirements.
In particular, their estimates single out the Golay code as a top performer.
We give an optimized fault-tolerant error-correction procedure for the Golay code that uses only
640 CNOT gates, while also being highly parallelizable. Our derivation is based on two main ideas.
First, we simplify Steane’s Latin-rectangle-based scheme for preparing encoded |0〉 states [Ste02], by
taking advantage of overlaps between the code’s stabilizers. Second, we reduce the overall number
of encoded |0〉 states required for error correction by carefully tracking the exact propagation of
errors. Both ideas are generally applicable to other large quantum error-correcting codes.
We then prove a lower bound on the threshold for depolarizing noise of 1.32× 10−3 noise per
gate. This result is an order of magnitude improvement over the best previous lower bound for
the Golay code [AC07] based on an adversarial noise model. It is also about 5 percent better than
the lower bound due to [AP09] also for depolarizing noise, but based on a dramatically different
fault-tolerance scheme. Our proof uses malignant set counting [AGP06], extensively tailored for
our specific error correction circuits and for depolarizing noise. Instead of assuming adversarial
noise at higher levels of code concatenation, the counting procedure keeps track of multiple types of
malignant events to create a transformed stochastic noise model for each level, allowing for a more
accurate analysis.
1.1 Fault-tolerant error correction
There are exceptions to the common paradigm, sketched in Figure 1, of alternating computational
and error correction steps. In a scheme proposed by Knill, for example, error-correction and compu-
tation are performed simultaneously by teleporting into specially prepared ancilla states [Kni04a].
Zalka [Zal97] has suggested balancing the costs of computation and error correction by having mul-
tiple computation steps between error-correction rounds, but error propagation between code blocks
makes such a scheme challenging to analyze precisely. Surface-code-based quantum fault-tolerance
schemes make a more radical change: they implement encoded gates using gradual code deforma-
tion, during which error correction occurs frequently. However, while these schemes appear very
promising [RHG06, RH07], they have proved difficult to analyze precisely and rigorously [DKLP02].
2
A variety of error-correction techniques have been studied, and three broad categories are
so-called Shor-type [Sho96], Steane-type [Ste97] and Knill-type [Kni04a] error correction. This is
only a rough categorization, and it leaves significant room for introducing new ideas and optimization
within or beyond these categories; see, e.g., [Rei04, DA07, AC07]. The Shor-, Steane- and Knill-type
error-correction schemes rely on the use of ancillary qubits to extract error information from the
data blocks. Before interacting with the data, the ancilla qubits need to be prepared in an entangled
state. (Surface-code-based schemes are again an exception, and the nine-qubit Bacon-Shor code is
an exception at the first level of code concatenation.)
As a concrete example, consider Steane-type error-correction. Arbitrary errors can be written
as linear combinations of tensor products of Pauli errors: the identity I = ( 1 00 1 ), a bit-flip error
X = ( 0 11 0 ), a phase-flip error Z =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
, and both bit- and phase-flip errors Y =
(
0 −i
i 0
)
= iXZ.
Each tensor product can itself be decomposed as a product of a Z-error part—a tensor product
of I and Z operators—and an X-error part—a tensor product of I and X operators. Steane
error-correction works by correcting Z and X errors separately. First, Z errors are copied from the
data to an encoded |0〉 ancilla by transversal CNOT gates, i.e., CNOT gates from each qubit of the
ancilla block to the corresponding qubit of the data. X errors are similarly copied onto an encoded
ancilla state |+〉 = 1√
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(|0〉+ |1〉). The ancillas are then measured in order to determine a correction.
Preparing ancilla states can be complicated, particularly because errors in the preparation circuit
can spread through the ancilla block. For example, a single physical fault may lead to errors on
multiple ancilla qubits. The code is limited by its distance and cannot necessarily protect against
such correlated errors. As a result, the ancilla states themselves must be checked for errors.
The complexity of verifying prepared ancillas against errors grows quickly as the code distance
increases. For large codes, verification of encoded |0〉 and |+〉 is accomplished by using additional
identically prepared “auxiliary” ancillas. In a manner similar to error correction, errors from the
initial ancilla are copied onto the auxiliary ancillas and then the auxiliary ancillas are measured. If
measurements imply the presence of an error, then all of the ancillas are discarded and the entire
process begins anew. Otherwise, the ancilla is accepted and may be used for error correction. Of
course, the auxilliary ancillas may also contain errors. These errors can spread to the initial ancilla
and invalidate the verification. Thus the auxiliary ancillas must also be checked for errors by yet
more ancillas. The end result is a series of recursive verifications that involves many encoded ancillas,
and dominates the overall overhead cost of error correction.
To maximize efficiency, preparation and verification circuits may be constructed using a pipeline
architecture in which part of the computer is dedicated to preparing many ancillas in parallel. Even
so, ancilla production constitutes the majority of the space requirement for a fault-tolerant quantum
circuit. In [IWPK08], for example, the ancilla pipeline is estimated to take up to 68 percent of the
entire circuit footprint.
For the Golay code, this recursive verification technique requires twelve encoded ancillas and at
least 1177 CNOT gates. One such circuit is shown in Figure 2. Variants of this circuit have been
used in previous studies of the Golay code, including in [Ste03] and [CDT09]. The construction of
this circuit implicitly assumes a kind of worst-case error behavior in which all possible codeword
preparation circuits propagate errors in the same way. However, DiVincenzo and Aliferis [DA07]
have observed that different preparation circuits exhibit different error propagation behavior, and
this can be exploited. By considering many different preparation circuits, we observe that some
circuits give favorable combinations of correlated errors, and thus require fewer error verification
steps, substantially reducing overhead. In Section 3 we provide two circuits that require only four
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Figure 2: This circuit produces a single Golay encoded |0〉 state that is ready to be used in fault-tolerant
error correction. Each of the twelve encoded |0〉 ancillas, denoted |0〉, is identically prepared using the Steane
Latin rectangle method (see Section 3.1). The wires represent 23-qubit code blocks and the indicated CNOT
and measurement operations are transversal.∣∣0〉
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Figure 3: Our simplified ancilla preparation and verification circuit uses only four encoded |0〉 ancillas. The
ancillas are prepared using different encoding circuits, shown in Figure 4 and Table 1.
encoded |0〉 ancillas and as few as 297 CNOT gates. One of these circuits is specified by Figures 3
and 4, and Table 1.
The overhead required to prepare a fault-tolerant ancilla depends on the probability that any
errors are detected. Table 2 shows estimates of the probability that all of the verification stages
accept along with the corresponding expected resource requirements for the different verification
circuits. For depolarizing noise rates near p = 10−3, our circuits reduce both the expected number of
qubits and the expected number of CNOT gates by roughly a factor of four over the twelve-ancilla
circuit. A more detailed analysis of the acceptance probability and overhead is given in Section 5.
1.2 Code concatenation and the noise threshold
We consider fault-tolerant, noisy simulations constructed by compiling an ideal quantum circuit
into a sequence of rectangles, each of which contains an encoded operation and a trailing error
correction (TEC). Following [AGP06], we define a rectangle to be correct if the action of the
rectangle followed by an ideal decoder, i.e., a decoder containing no errors, is equivalent to the
action of an ideal decoder followed by an ideal implementation of the corresponding gate. If a
rectangle is not correct then it is incorrect. In other words, a correct rectangle effectively acts as an
encoded version of the intended gate. If all rectangles are correct then a simple induction argument
shows that the compiled, noisy circuit successfully simulates the original ideal circuit.
For a fixed stochastic noise model and a fixed quantum error-correcting code, the probability
that a rectangle is correct is a constant and therefore the probability that all rectangles are correct
will generally be exponentially small in the number of gates in the circuit being simulated. To
achieve a constant success probability, a process known as code concatenation [KL96] is often used.
In a concatenated fault tolerant simulation, each gate is first compiled into a rectangle, called a
level-one rectangle (1-Rec), as described above. Then, a level-two rectangle (2-Rec) is constructed
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
0 |0〉 0
1 |0〉 1
2 |0〉 2
3 |0〉 3
4 |0〉 4
5 |0〉 5
6 |0〉 6
7 |0〉 7
8 |0〉 8
9 |0〉 9
10 |0〉 10
11 |0〉 11
12 |+〉 12
13 |+〉 13
14 |+〉 14
15 |+〉 15
16 |+〉 16
17 |+〉 17
18 |+〉 18
19 |+〉 19
20 |+〉 20
21 |+〉 21
22 |+〉 22
Figure 4: An optimized circuit for preparing |0〉 encoded in the Golay code uses 57 CNOT gates applied in
seven rounds. Gates in the same round are applied in parallel. The construction is detailed in Section 3.2.
Ancilla Qubit permutation
|0〉2 (0, 20, 13, 7, 12, 14, 1)(2, 11)(3, 19, 5, 4, 8, 22, 6, 15, 10, 16, 9, 18, 21, 17)
|0〉3 (0, 14, 6, 12, 16, 2, 11, 22, 17, 21, 9, 20, 5, 7, 3, 13, 18, 4, 15, 1, 10, 8, 19)
|0〉4 (0, 12, 4, 17, 9, 6, 1)(2, 10, 18, 22, 21, 16, 13)(3, 11, 20, 15, 7, 19, 5)(8)(14)
Table 1: The first ancilla in Figure 3 is prepared using the circuit of Figure 4. The other three ancillas are
prepared in the same way, except with the qubits rearranged according to the above permutations.
Verification Pr[accept] E[# qubits] min # CNOTs E[# CNOTs]
Steane-12 0.419± 0.001 5183± 14.2 1177 1782± 4.9
Steane-4 0.648± 0.002 1413± 3.7 377 497.6± 1.3
Overlap-4 0.633± 0.002 1399± 3.8 297 399.4± 1.1
Table 2: Estimates of the acceptance probability and overhead for the twelve-ancilla fault-tolerant ancilla
preparation circuit and our two optimized circuits, at a depolarizing noise rate of p = 10−3. The Steane-4
circuit is based on ancillas prepared according to Table 4. Overlap-4 is based on ancillas prepared according
to Figure 4 and Table 1. The column labeled Pr[accept] gives the probability that all auxiliary ancilla
measurements in the verification circuit detect no errors. The next column, E[qubits], gives the expected
number of physical qubits required to produce one verified encoded |0〉. This is calculated recursively, by
computing the expected number of qubits needed to pass each verification step. The last two columns specify,
respectively, the minimum number of CNOT gates and the expected number of CNOT gates required to
produce a single verified ancilla.
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by compiling each physical gate of the 1-Rec into a rectangle. This process is repeated as many
times as desired. The end result is a circuit composed of a hierarchy of rectangles.
At each level k of concatenation, the probability that the k-Rec is correct increases relative to
level k − 1 so long as the strength of the noise is below a certain value called the threshold. The
threshold is calculated by upper bounding the probability that each type of rectangle is incorrect.
In [AGP06] the upper bound is obtained by counting malignant sets of locations inside an object
called the extended rectangle, or exRec, which consists of the rectangle together with its leading error
correction (LEC). A set of locations is considered malignant if there exists some fixed combination
of nontrivial Pauli errors acting on that set of locations that causes the rectangle to be incorrect.
Malignant set counting works for a broad class of noise models including so-called adversarial
noise in which locations fail independently at random, but the error at each failing location is chosen
by an adversary and may be correlated with errors at other failing locations. For more restricted
noise models such as depolarizing noise, however, malignant set counting is overly pessimistic.
Roughly, this is because the definition of a malignant set is independent of the underlying noise
model and, therefore, malignant set counting ignores a large amount of information.
In Sections 4.2 and 4.3 we outline a modified malignant set counting technique that more
accurately computes the threshold for depolarizing noise acting on fault-tolerant simulations
constructed with our error-correction circuits. Our counting method introduces two new ideas.
First, for computational efficiency, we break up the exRec into a hierarchy of components and count
X and Z errors separately to keep the total number of error combinations small. This technique
allows us to analyze larger subsets of faulty locations than would otherwise be possible. Second,
we construct at each level a transformed noise model, similar to depolarizing noise, by separately
accounting for multiple types of malignant events. ExRecs at each level of code concatenation
behave in a self-similar manner under the transformed noise, thus admitting a straightforward
threshold calculation.
2 The Golay code
The Golay code is a perfect CSS [[23, 1, 7]] quantum error-correcting code (see e.g., [Ste03]). It has
eleven X and eleven Z stabilizer generators. The code is self-dual, and the X and Z stabilizer
generators can both be given by the following eleven 23-character strings:
. 1 . . 1 . . 1 1 1 1 1 . . . . . . . . . . 1
1 . . 1 . . 1 1 1 1 1 . . . . . . . . . . 1 .
. 1 1 . 1 1 1 . . . 1 1 . . . . . . . . 1 . .
1 1 . 1 1 1 . . . 1 1 . . . . . . . . 1 . . .
1 1 1 1 . . . 1 . . 1 1 . . . . . . 1 . . . .
1 . 1 . 1 . 1 1 1 . . 1 . . . . . 1 . . . . .
. . . 1 1 1 1 . 1 1 . 1 . . . . 1 . . . . . .
. . 1 1 1 1 . 1 1 . 1 . . . . 1 . . . . . . .
. 1 1 1 1 . 1 1 . 1 . . . . 1 . . . . . . . .
1 1 1 1 . 1 1 . 1 . . . . 1 . . . . . . . . .
1 . 1 . . 1 . . 1 1 1 1 1 . . . . . . . . . .
(2.1)
Here, the 1s in a row either all indicate Z operators or all indicate X operators, and dots indicate
identity operators. For example, the first line indicates that I ⊗ Z ⊗ I ⊗ I ⊗ Z ⊗ · · · ⊗ Z and
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I ⊗X ⊗ I ⊗ I ⊗X ⊗ · · · ⊗X are stabilizers. Note that each stabilizer generator has weight eight.
We index the qubits left to right, from 0 to 22.
The stabilizer generators partition the group of Pauli errors on 23-qubits into 224 cosets. In
particular, there are 223−11 = 212 inequivalent X errors (tensor products of X and I) and 212
inequivalent Z errors (tensor products of Z and I).
The Golay code is preserved by qubit permutations in a symmetry group known as the Mathieu
group M23. This is a four-transitive group of order 23 · 22 · 21 · 20 · 48. It is generated by a cyclic
shift, and by the permutation
(2, 16, 9, 6, 8)(3, 12, 13, 18, 4)(7, 17, 10, 11, 22)(14, 19, 21, 20, 15) ,
in cycle notation. See [PBH98, pp. 1411] and [Gan99].
3 Ancilla preparation and verification
Our error-correction circuits require multiple encoded |0〉 and |+〉 states. The Golay code is self-dual,
so encoded |+〉 is prepared by taking the dual of the |0〉 circuit in the natural way (i.e., swapping
|0〉 and |+〉 and reversing the direction of each CNOT gate). There are many possible ways to
encode |0〉. Our most efficient preparation circuit is shown in Figure 4, and prepares encoded |0〉 in
the Golay code with a total of 57 CNOT gates. This circuit provides an efficient means of preparing
encoded ancillas, but it is not fault-tolerant on its own.
We define strict fault-tolerance as follows:
Definition 3.1. An ancilla encoded into a code with distance d is strictly fault-tolerant if for all
k ≤ bd/2c, any error of probability order k propagates to an error of weight at most k.
The circuit in Figure 4 is clearly not strictly fault-tolerant because, for example, with first order
probability a faulty CNOT gate may produce an error of weight two when an X-error occurs on
both its control qubit and its target qubit. We call this error, and any other for which the weight of
the resulting error is larger than the probability order with which it occurs, “correlated”.
To achieve strict fault tolerance, additional encoded ancillas are prepared. Errors from the
original ancilla are copied onto the additional ancillas which are then measured. If no errors are
detected, the ancilla is accepted and may be used for error correction on the data. Otherwise, the
ancilla is rejected, all of the prepared ancillas are discarded, and the procedure is restarted. In
Figure 3, two pairs of ancillas are prepared. One of the ancillas from each pair is checked for X
errors. If neither check detects an error, then one of the two remaining ancillas is used to check the
other for Z errors.
Care must be taken in preparing the additional ancillas, however. For example, say that two
encoded ancillas are identically prepared. Assume that a single failure occurs in the first ancilla and
propagates through the preparation circuit to produce a weight three error. Then the same single
failure in the other ancilla will produce the same weight three error. When the error from the first
ancilla is copied to the second, the two errors will cancel each other and no error will be detected.
This is a second order event that results in a weight-three error.
Therefore, we seek to prepare encoded ancillas that produce different correlated error sets. In
this section we provide two related methods for constructing fault-tolerant ancillas encoded in the
Golay code using the circuit in Figure 3. In Section 3.1 we analyze the correlated errors produced by
preparation circuits constructed with the standard Latin rectangle method and provide a randomized
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Weight: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Number of X errors: 1 23 253 1771 1771 253 23 1
Number of Z errors: 1 23 253 1771 0 0 0 0
Table 3: The number of errors on Golay encoded |0〉 by Hamming weight. All Z errors are correctable so
there are no Z errors of weight greater than three.
method for finding ancillas with different correlated error sets. In Section 3.2 we describe a new
preparation circuit specific to the Golay code and again provide a randomized method for finding
ancillas with different correlated error sets.
3.1 Randomized method for preparing encoded |0〉
The standard method for preparing encoded states for CSS stabilizer codes, including the Golay
code, is to construct and solve a partial Latin rectangle based on the stabilizer generators [Ste02].
To prepare |0〉 in the Golay code, consider the eleven stabilizer generators that are tensor products
of Pauli X operators. These stabilizer generators form an 11× 23 binary matrix in which the X
operators in the tensor product are represented as 1s, as in Eq. (2.1). Gaussian elimination is
performed until the matrix is of the form
11
{( 11︷︸︸︷
I
12︷︸︸︷
A
)
(3.1)
The first eleven qubits, called “control” qubits, are prepared as |+〉, and the remaining “target”
qubits are prepared as |0〉. The matrix A represents a partial Latin rectangle, the solution to which
is used to schedule rounds of CNOT gates from control to target qubits.
An X error in the preparation circuit can propagate to other qubits only if it occurs on a control
qubit, and then only through the X stabilizer being created from that control qubit. Thus single
faults can create up to 22 weight-two errors (for each of the eleven X stabilizers, either IIIIIIXX or
IIXXXXXX ∼ XXIIIIII), 22 weight-three errors and eleven weight-four errors (IIIIXXXX
for each stabilizer).
A single X fault, i.e., a fault resulting in an X error, cannot break the verification circuit in
Figure 3. If it creates a correlated error on the first ancilla, that error will be detected on the second
ancilla, and both will be discarded. Four or more X faults also cannot break the verification circuit
because we only seek fault tolerance up to order three.
Two X faults can break the verification circuit only if there is one failure in each ancilla
preparation that propagates to an error of weight at least three—necessarily the same error so
that it is undetected. To obtain a crude estimate for how likely this is to occur, pretend that the
correlated errors created by a random preparation circuit are uniformly distributed among all errors
of the same weights. The number of errors on encoded |0〉 for each weight are given in Table 3.
Then the probability that two preparation circuits share no such correlated errors is estimated as(
1771−22
22
)
( 177122 )
·
(
1771−11
11
)
( 177111 )
≈ 0.71 .
Three X errors can break the circuit if they lead to an undetected error of weight four or greater
on the first ancilla. Consider the case that there are two failures while preparing the first ancilla and
one failure while preparing the second ancilla. The number of different weight-four errors created
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with second-order probability (i.e., excluding those created with first-order probability) depends
on the circuit. For ten random circuits, the smallest count we obtained was 688 and the largest
735, with an average of 711. Using this average value, we estimate that the probability of a random
circuit succeeding against three X errors is roughly [
(
1771−711
11
)
/ ( 177111 )]
2 ≈ 1.2 · 10−5. (Here the
square is because we want the circuit to work against both the case of two failures in the first ancilla,
one failure in the second, and vice versa.) Overall, we expect to have to try about 1.2 · 105 random
pairs of preparation circuits before we find one that gives fully fault-tolerant X-error verification.
The result of X-error verification is a single ancilla free of correlated X errors up to weight-three,
but possibly containing correlated Z errors. The Z-error propagation can be analyzed in a manner
similar to that used for X errors. A single failure in an X-error verified ancilla can produce roughly
60 Z errors of weight three. Again assuming a uniform distribution, the probability of finding two
X-error verified ancillas that share no correlated Z errors of weight three is
(
1771−60
60
)
/ ( 177160 ) ≈ 0.12.
In total, we expect to try about five X-error fault-tolerant pairs in order to find two pairs that are
fully fault-tolerant for both X-error and Z-error verification, as ( 52 ) = 10.
To find fault-tolerant verification circuits in this way, one needs to be able to generate sufficiently
random preparation circuits. As the Latin rectangle procedure for finding encoding circuits is
fully algorithmic, it can be randomized by starting with a random presentation of the Golay code.
Alternatively, one can begin with a fixed encoding circuit and randomly permute the seven rounds
of CNOT gates (all of the CNOTs commute), or permute the qubits according to a random element
of the symmetry group M23. By trying roughly 10
5 random pairs, we found 14 pairs of ancillas that
were fully fault-tolerant against X errors. Of the ( 142 ) combinations, six were also fully fault-tolerant
against Z errors. Table 4 presents one such set.
3.2 Overlap method for preparing encoded |0〉
The above procedure for finding a fault-tolerant verification circuit uses ancilla preparation circuits
constructed from the Latin rectangle method. We now show an alternative construction based on a
modification of the Latin rectangle method. By carefully analyzing the stabilizer generators of the
Golay code we can reduce the number of CNOT gates required to prepare encoded |0〉.
To explain the optimization, first consider the Steane [[7, 1, 3]] code. A Latin rectangle-based
encoding schedule, shown in Figure 5(a), needs nine CNOT gates. An equivalent circuit requiring
only eight CNOT gates is shown in Figure 5(b). This circuit removes two of the CNOTs for which
qubit six is a target and replaces them with a single CNOT from qubit five to qubit six in round
three. This works because in 5(a) qubits five and six are both the targets of CNOTs from qubits
one and three; the corresponding stabilizer generators overlap on qubits five and six.
The same technique of exploiting overlap between stabilizers extends to larger CSS codes. For
the Golay code, Figure 4 gives an encoding circuit with only 57 CNOT gates, 20 fewer than given
by the Latin rectangle method.
By reducing the number of CNOT gates, this circuit also reduces the number of correlated
errors. For example, a single failure in the Latin rectangle encoded circuits can cause up to 22
weight-two errors, but a single failure in the new circuit can only cause up to 16 weight-two errors.
The correlated error counts for first and second order are shown in Table 5. The smaller number
of correlated errors means that it should be easier to find fault-tolerant circuits by randomization.
However, unlike Steane schedules the overlap schedule depends on a fixed code presentation and on
a fixed round ordering, since the CNOT gates do not commute.
To obtain randomized overlap method encoding circuits, we use the permutation symmetry of
9
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2 0 22 7 11 4 8 19
3 9 19 4 8 7 1 6
10 5 1 0 6 14 7 9
12 1 0 14 5 22 11 4
13 6 8 22 9 0 4 5
15 4 5 9 14 19 22 7
16 14 7 5 4 11 6 8
17 8 11 6 19 5 0 1
18 7 9 1 22 8 5 11
20 19 6 11 7 1 14 22
21 11 4 19 0 6 9 14
(a) Ancilla 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 5 16 17 22 1 15 9
3 15 2 6 5 17 16 11
7 1 22 4 17 2 5 6
8 6 13 16 1 15 4 17
10 22 11 5 13 16 6 1
12 9 17 13 2 6 22 16
14 4 6 11 15 13 2 22
18 16 1 15 11 9 13 2
19 17 4 1 9 22 11 13
20 11 15 9 6 4 1 5
21 2 5 22 16 11 9 4
(b) Ancilla 2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 21 16 7 13 10 15 0
2 16 7 12 0 18 19 13
3 13 0 15 12 19 10 20
4 12 21 18 20 7 13 10
5 6 13 21 10 0 18 19
8 18 19 13 21 15 20 16
9 19 6 10 15 20 7 21
11 20 12 6 7 13 16 15
14 7 18 20 16 21 0 6
17 0 15 19 6 16 21 12
22 10 20 16 19 6 12 18
(c) Ancilla 3
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 1 16 3 12 17 13 11
2 22 18 14 3 20 17 6
4 3 20 6 1 12 22 13
5 6 14 16 20 1 12 17
7 20 22 17 13 16 18 1
8 16 6 18 11 3 1 20
9 18 12 13 16 14 20 3
10 14 17 20 22 13 11 12
15 12 11 1 17 18 6 22
19 17 13 11 18 6 16 14
21 11 3 12 6 22 14 16
(d) Ancilla 4
Table 4: Four seven-round ancilla-preparation schedules. In each table, the entry in row i, column j specifies
the target qubit of a CNOT gate with control qubit i applied in round j. Using these schedules in the
verification circuit of Figure 3, the output encoded |0〉 state is fully fault-tolerant against both X and Z errors.
|+〉 • • •
|+〉 • • •
|0〉  
|+〉 • • •
|0〉  
|0〉  
|0〉   
(a)
|+〉 • • •
|+〉 • •
|0〉  
|+〉 • •
|0〉  
|0〉   •
|0〉  
(b)
Figure 5: Two alternative circuits for preparing encoded |0〉 in the Steane code, a self-dual code with X
stabilizers IIIXXXX, IXXIIXX and XIXIXIX. The circuit in (a) follows Steane’s Latin rectangle
encoding method. The circuit in (b) prepares the same state using one fewer CNOT gate. The new CNOT
gate has the same effect as the two removed gates.
X-error weight: 2 3 4 5 6 7
Order 1: 16 14 4 0 0 0
Order 2: - 493 400 35 2 0
Table 5: Correlated X-error counts for the encoded |0〉 circuit in Figure 4.
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the Golay code and permute the qubits of Figure 4 according to a pseudo-random element of the
symmetry group M23. By analyzing the correlated error sets of randomly permuted circuits, we
have found many sets of fault-tolerant four-ancilla preparation circuits. In fact, we have even found
sets for which the order required for a weight-k error to pass verification is at least k + 1 (rather
than k) for all k ≤ 2. This reduces, for example, the probability of accumulating an uncorrectable
error on the data block by first a weight-two error in Z-error correction and then another weight-two
error in X-error correction. One such set of four permutations is given in Table 1.
We briefly note that the overlap method, and the circuit in Figure 4 in particular, may not
be optimal. Indeed the are equivalent circuits with fewer CNOT gates. However, Figure 4 is the
smallest circuit we found that also preserves depth. In the asymptotic setting, for arbitrarily large
circuits of CNOT gates, our method bares resemblance to the algorithm presented in [PMH03].
Both methods exploit similarities across columns (or rows) of a matrix to eliminate CNOT gates.
Our method differs in that we use only the redundancy matrix rather than the full n × n linear
transformation, and we exploit similarities between columns without first using Gaussian elimination
to make the columns identical. This way, making the optimization by hand, we are able to preserve
circuit depth.
4 Threshold analysis
The remainder of this article focuses on analyzing the noise threshold and resource overhead for
fault-tolerant quantum computation using the Golay code ancilla preparation and verification
circuits from Section 3. Our threshold analysis relies on a malignant set counting technique that is
tailored for a depolarizing noise model. The counting technique is outlined in Section 4.2 and proof
of the threshold lower bound is presented in Section 4.3. (Some details are given in the appendices.)
Threshold calculation results for our circuits are discussed in Section 4.4. Resource overhead is
considered in Section 5.
4.1 Noise model
We begin by defining the depolarizing noise model, a standard model used before in, e.g., [Kni04b].
We study noisy circuits constructed from the following physical operations: |0〉 and |+〉 initialization,
a CNOT gate, and single-qubit measurement in the Z and X eigenbases. Every qubit in the
computer can be involved in at most one operation per discrete time step. CNOT gates are allowed
between arbitrary qubits, without geometry constraints. Resting qubits are also subject to noise.
Definition 4.1 (Independent depolarizing noise with parameter γ). Noisy operations are modeled by:
1. A noisy CNOT gate is a perfect CNOT gate followed by, with probability 1615γ, the simultaneous
depolarization of the two involved qubits. Equivalently, after applying the ideal CNOT gate,
with probability 15γ a non-trivial two-qubit Pauli error drawn uniformly and independently
from {I,X, Y, Z}⊗2 \ {I ⊗ I} is applied.
2. Noisy preparation of a |0〉 state is modeled as ideal preparation of |0〉, followed by application
of an X error with probability 4γ. Similarly, noisy preparation of |+〉 is modeled as ideal
preparation of |+〉 with probability 1− 4γ and of |−〉 = Z|+〉 with probability 4γ.
11
3. Noisy Z-basis (|0〉, |1〉) measurement is modeled by applying an X error with probability 4γ,
followed by ideal Z-basis measurement. Similarly, noisy X-basis (|+〉, |−〉) measurement is
modeled as ideal measurement except preceded by a Z error with probability 4γ.
4. A noisy rest operation is modeled as applying either the identity gate, with probability 1− 12γ,
or with probability 4γ each, one of the Pauli errors X, Y or Z.
All locations fail independently of each other. Let p = 15γ, the probability for a CNOT gate to fail.
To justify this noise model, note that the noise on a resting qubit is the one-qubit marginal of
the CNOT gate noise. The noise rate for preparation and measurement is lower, only 4γ, because
any higher noise rate could be reduced to 4γ +O(γ2) by repeating the preparation or measurement
operation using two qubits coupled by a CNOT.
During error counting, X and Z errors are usually considered separately and the error probability
is computed by omitting the Z or X part of each error, respectively. For example, when considering
only X errors XY is equivalent to XX, XZ is equivalent to XI and so on. Thus, the marginal
distribution of X errors for a CNOT gate applies with probability 12γ a uniformly random error
from {IX,XI,XX}. Similarly, for Z errors, the marginal error distribution applies a random error
from {IZ, ZI, ZZ}. For preparing |0〉 or measuring in the Z basis, no Z errors are possible, and
similarly no X errors are possible for preparing |+〉 or measuring in the X basis. The marginal X-
and Z-error distributions for a rest are to apply X and Z, respectively, errors with probability 8γ.
4.2 Counting malignant sets
As we have shown, our two optimized ancilla preparation and verification circuits significantly reduce
the overhead required for fault-tolerant ancilla preparation. We would also like to know how these
circuits impact the tolerable noise threshold. With fewer verification stages our ancillas are slightly
more likely to contain errors and so one might expect a lower noise threshold when compared to
previous verification circuits. On the other hand, the smaller size of our circuits makes it easier to
give a tighter analysis.
The threshold calculation is most limited by the exRec with the largest number of locations. The
Golay code admits transversal implementations of encoded Clifford group unitaries. Universality
can be achieved by injection and distillation [BK05, Kni04b], which involves only Clifford group
unitaries, and the single-qubit preparations and measurements that are already assumed by our
model. Therefore the largest exRec in our case is for the encoded CNOT gate, an exRec that
consists of four Steane-type error corrections plus 23 CNOT gates (see Figure 6). Table 6 gives a
breakdown of the number of locations for our preparation circuits, and the total number of locations
in the CNOT exRec.
Monte Carlo simulations of circuits using the Golay code [Ste03, CDT09] indicate that the
depolarizing noise threshold should be on the order of p = 10−3. Unfortunately, it is not straightfor-
ward to prove such a high threshold using malignant set counting. For example, say that we check
for malignancy all location subsets of size up to kgood, and we assume that all larger subsets are
malignant. Then the estimate we obtain for the probability of an incorrect rectangle is at least∑n
k=kgood+1
( nk ) p
k(1 − p)n−k. For n = 5439 locations and p = 10−3, this term drops below 10−3
only for kgood ≥ 14. However, there are more than 1041 subsets of size at most 14, so checking them
one at a time is computationally intractable.
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Figure 6: Organization of a CNOT extended rectangle, or “exRec.” (a) The CNOT exRec includes four
error corrections, two leading (LEC) and two trailing (TEC), and a transversal CNOT gate. (b) Each
error-correction component consists of separate Z and X error corrections. Z-error correction requires a |0〉
state that has been verified against errors, and X-error correction requires a verified |+〉 ancilla state. (c) A
verified |0〉 state is prepared by checking two pairs of prepared |0〉 states against each other for X errors,
then, conditioned on no X errors being detected, checking the results against each other for Z errors. Verified
|+〉 is prepared by taking the dual of the |0〉 circuit. These components are discussed, in reverse order, in
Sections 4.2.2 to 4.2.5.
Instead of checking each set for malignancy, one can sample random sets of locations in order to
estimate the fraction that are malignant. This technique, called malignant set sampling, can provide
threshold estimates with statistical confidence intervals. However, both malignant set counting
and sampling techniques study the threshold for worst-case adversarial noise, and may be overly
conservative for a more physically realistic, non-adversarial noise model such as depolarizing noise.
For example, malignant set sampling results from [AC07] estimate a threshold of only p ≈ 10−4 for
the Golay code.
We therefore present an alternative to malignant set counting that is tailored to circuits based on
the Golay code and depolarizing noise. Roughly, we divide the exRec into a hierarchy of components
and sub-components. We then compute an upper bound on the probability of each error a component
may produce, essentially by checking location sets up to a certain small size. At the exRec level, we
synthesize the component error bounds into upper bounds on the probability that the rectangle is
incorrect. The resulting error probabilities are treated as an effective transformed noise model for
the encoded circuit. With some care, the transformed noise model can be fed recursively back into
the procedure to determine an effective noise model for the next level of encoding, and so on.
Effectively, dividing the exRec into components allows us to account efficiently for even very
large location subsets. Most large sets will be roughly evenly divided between the components, with
only a small number of locations in each component.
13
|0〉 preparation Location type CNOT exRec
circuit CNOT Prep. Meas. Rest Total total
Steane 77 23 0 6 106 5439
Overlap 57 23 0 38 118 5823
Table 6: Location counts for preparing encoded |0〉 in the Golay code. Encoded |0〉 ancillas are prepared
with either the pseudorandomly constructed Steane preparation circuits (Table 4), or the overlap preparation
circuits (Figure 4 and Table 1). The last column shows the total number of locations inside the CNOT exRec
shown in Figure 6, including the transversal CNOT operation and four error corrections.
χin, ζin Component with K failures χout, ζout
Figure 7: A circuit component with input error (χin, ζin) and output error (χout, ζout)
The remainder of this section outlines our modified malignant set counting technique. Details of
the threshold analysis are given in Section 4.3.
4.2.1 Characterizing exRec components
We will divide the exRec into its encoded operation and its error corrections. The error corrections
will each divide into X-error correction and Z-error correction, and further recursive divisions will
continue until reaching the physical location level.
Each component in the hierarchy has input error (χin, ζin), some number of internal failures K,
and output error (χout, ζout) which depends on the internal failures and on the input error (see
Figure 7). For every error equivalence class on the inputs and outputs and for every k ∈ N, we
would like to compute
Pr
[
(χout, ζout) = (xout, zout),K = k | (χin, ζin) = (xin, zin)
]
, (4.1)
the probability that there are exactly k failures and the output error is (xout, zout) conditioned
on the input error (xin, zin). Here, the notation (x, z) indicates an error equal to the product xz
where x is a tensor product of X and I operators and z is a tensor product of Z and I operators.
For components that are physical gate locations the probability in (4.1) is defined by the
depolarizing noise model (Definition 4.1). Larger components are analyzed by first analyzing each
enclosed sub-component. At the exRec level the LEC, transversal CNOT and TEC components
provide all of the information necessary to determine the probability that the exRec is incorrect.
Indeed, we shall see in Section 4.2.5 that they contain enough information to compute the probability
for each way that the exRec can be incorrect.
There are, however, two logistical problems. First, on each 23-qubit code block, there are 212
inequivalent X errors and 212 inequivalent Z errors, and thus 224 inequivalent Pauli errors total.
(For example, there are 223 different tensor products of X and I operators, and the group of X
stabilizers has size 211, leaving 212 X-error equivalence classes.) For a component involving two code
blocks, this means we should compute for each k up to (224)4 quantities, one for each combination
of input and output errors. Second, since there are ( nk ) size-k subsets of n locations and since each
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CNOT gate has 15 different ways to fail, a computation that accounts for all possibilities scales
roughly as ( nk ) 15
k. Such a computation is feasible only for small k and small n.
The first problem can be solved by observing that in Steane error correction X errors and Z errors
are corrected separately. Furthermore, there are no Hadamard gates or other ways of transforming
an X error into a Z error, or vice versa, so X and Z errors mostly propagate independently. X and
Z errors cannot be treated independently entirely, because X and Z failures are highly correlated
in the depolarizing noise model, and the postselection steps in ancilla verification could amplify any
initial dependencies. Still, for most components, the X-error part of the output of a component
depends only on the X-error part of the input and the X failures that occur inside the component.
A similar observation holds for Z errors. Thus, expression (4.1) may be split into separate X and Z
parts:
Pr[χout = xout,KX = k|χin = xin] (4.2a)
Pr[ζout = zout,KZ = k|ζin = zin] . (4.2b)
Here, the random variable KX is the number of failures inside the component that contain an
X when decomposed into a tensor product of Pauli operators. The value KZ is similarly defined
for Z. When considering X and Z errors separately, the input and output of a two-block component
contain at most 224 inequivalent errors and the worst case combination is a large but manageable
248 cases.
The second problem is eliminated by noting that, for a fixed k, the probability of an order-k
fault decreases rapidly as the size of the component decreases. For example, for p = 1× 10−3, the
probability of an order-ten fault in the exRec is about 0.027. However, the probability that all ten
failures are located in a single error correction is only about 1.4× 10−6. Thus there is little gain in
counting errors of order-ten or higher in the error correction component.
In general, the probability that a component contains a fault of order greater than kgood can be
bounded according to
Pr[K > kgood] ≤
n∑
k=kgood+1
( nk ) (1− p)n−kpk . (4.3)
(A tighter bound can be achieved by considering separate k for each location type. See Appendix A.1.)
We will choose a value of kgood for each component and then pessimistically assume that all faults
of order greater than kgood within the component cause the rectangle to be incorrect. For large
enough values of kgood the overall impact on the threshold is negligible. There is a tradeoff here
between running time and accuracy. A larger value of kgood yields a more accurate bound on the
probability that the rectangle is incorrect. A smaller value of kgood is easier to compute. We must
choose for each component a suitable kgood that balances the two.
In the end we are left with two sets of faults for each component, those of order at most kgood
and those of order greater than kgood. Each fault in the first set is counted to obtain accurate
estimates of (4.2a) and (4.2b). When a fault from this set occurs we call it a good event. Faults in
the second set are not counted and are instead bounded using (4.3) and pessimistically added to
the final incorrectness probability bounds for the exRec. When a fault from this set occurs we call
it a bad event. The probability that the rectangle is incorrect is then upper-bounded by
Pr[incorrect] ≤ Pr[incorrect, good] + Pr[bad] .
In general, there are four quantities we need to upper bound for each component: Pr[χout =
xout,KX = k, goodX |χin], Pr[ζout = zout,KZ = k, goodZ |ζin], Pr[badX ], and Pr[badZ ]. The event
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goodX ≡ ¬badX occurs when there is a set of X-error failures in the component that we choose
to count. It will usually depend only on kgood in which case goodX ⇔ (KX ≤ kgood). In some
cases goodX may depend on a vector ~k representing the number of X-error failures across multiple
sub-components. The event goodZ ≡ ¬badZ is similarly defined for Z.
In the remainder of this section we outline the procedure for computing the above quantities for
each component of the CNOT exRec. A more precise analysis is presented in Appendix A.
4.2.2 X-error verification
X-error verification requires two encoded |0〉 states. The first is verified against the second for X
errors by applying transversal CNOT gates between the two code blocks and then measuring each
qubit of the second block in the Z eigenbasis (|0〉, |1〉 basis). Conditioned on no X errors being
detected, the first code block is accepted. See Figure 6(c).
Letting accept denote the event that no X errors are detected, we use Bayes’s rule
Pr[event|accept] = Pr[event, accept]
Pr[accept]
(4.4)
to compute the conditional probabilities of different error events. For an event χ involving only X
errors, this calculation is straightforward.
However, if the event is a Z error ζ, then the numerator Pr[ζ = z, accept] is difficult to compute
as it mixes X and Z errors. The obvious bound, Pr[ζ = z, accept] ≤ Pr[ζ = z], is quite pessimistic
because in the depolarizing noise model we expect X errors to occur with Z errors roughly half
of the time, and so X-error verification should remove many Z errors. It is important to obtain
an accurate count of Z errors since they strongly influence the acceptance rate of the upcoming
Z-error verification. Therefore, we also count X and Z errors together for very low-order faults and
apply a correction to the Z-only counts. Details of the correction are worked out in Appendix A.2.
4.2.3 Z-error verification
Z-error verification is similar to X-error verification. However, as shown in Figure 6(c), we add a
pause, i.e., transversal rest operations, to allow the preceding X-error postselection to complete.
Similar to X-error verification, all events are now conditioned on the event accept of no Z errors
being detected. When considering an X-error event χ, we generally use the pessimistic inequality
Pr[χ = x, accept] ≤ Pr[χ = x]. This inequality is less of a problem than the similar inequality
Pr[ζ = z, accept] ≤ Pr[ζ = z] we encountered during X-error verification, for two reasons. First,
many X errors have already been eliminated, so the probabilities start out much lower. Second,
overestimating the probability of an X error now is less serious; since there are no remaining
postselection steps, the distribution of errors will not need to be renormalized again. Even so, we
count X and Z errors together for very low-order faults, since it is relatively easy to do so.
4.2.4 Error correction
An error-correction component consists of Z-error correction and X-error correction, as shown
in Figure 6(b). Each sub-component begins with a pause on the input verified ancilla state, to
allow for the previous postselection to complete. After extracting the error syndrome, the lowest-
weight correction is computed, and this correction is applied by a change in the qubits’ Pauli
frames [Kni04b].
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There are two types of error correction components, leading error correction (LEC) and trailing
error correction (TEC). For the LEC, we may assume that the input errors χin and ζin are both
zero. This because the probability that the rectangle is incorrect depends only on the syndrome of
the output of the LEC and that syndrome depends only on the errors inside of the LEC [CDT09].
That is, we do not care about the logical state at the output of the LEC, we care only that it is
correctly manipulated by the rectangle. For trailing error correction, we care only about the result
of applying a logical decoder to the output. In other words, we only need to know whether the
output errors χout and ζout represent correctable errors or not. The four relevant quantities are
Pr[χout = xout,KX = k, good|χin = 0] Pr[D(χout) = d,KX = k, good|χin = xin]
Pr[ζout = zout,KZ = k, good|ζin = 0] Pr[D(ζout) = d,KZ = k, good|ζin = zin]
where d ∈ {0, 1} and D(e) identifies whether e is a correctable error (0) or an uncorrectable error
(1). That is, D(e) = 1 if and only if e decodes to a nontrivial Pauli error.
4.2.5 exRec
The CNOT exRec, shown in Figure 6(a), is divided into five components: two leading error
corrections, a transversal CNOT, and two trailing error corrections. At this level, we are interested
in malignant events—the events for which the rectangle is incorrect. More specifically, when a
malignant event occurs we would like to know how the rectangle is incorrect.
Let |ψ1〉 be the two-qubit state obtained by applying ideal decoders on the two blocks of the CNOT
immediately following the LECs. Similarly let |ψ2〉 be the state obtained by applying ideal decoders
immediately following the TECs. Then define malIX as the event that (I ⊗X)Ucnot|ψ1〉 = |ψ2〉,
where Ucnot is the two-qubit unitary corresponding to the ideal CNOT gate. Similarly define the
events malXI , malXX , malIZ , malZI , malZZ . The event malE can be informally interpreted as the
event in which the rectangle introduces a “logical” error E.
The relevant quantities are Pr[MX ,KX = k, good] and Pr[MZ ,KZ = k, good] for MX ∈
{malIX ,malXI ,malXX} and MZ ∈ {malIZ ,malZI ,malZZ}. Since we count X and Z errors sepa-
rately, it is not possible to compute logical Y error quantities. Our analysis will therefore double-count
Y errors. Intuitively this is not a great loss, because the correlations between X and Z are much
smaller at this level. In the next section we show how to use these quantities to compute a lower
bound on the threshold for depolarizing noise.
4.3 Calculating the error threshold
As discussed in Section 1.2, the standard way of calculating the asymptotic error threshold involves
finding subsets of faulty exRec locations (called “malignant”) for which some combination of Pauli
errors at those locations causes the enclosed rectangle to be incorrect. Our counting method is
different. We count subsets of faulty locations, but the counted information is synthesized into error
probability upper bounds based on a particular noise model and error correction scheme.
In this section we outline an alternative method for rigorously lower bounding the noise threshold
that is tailored specifically to the information obtained by our counting procedure. The basic idea is
to treat each level-one rectangle in the level-two simulation as a single “location” with a transformed
noise model based on the malignant event upper bounds obtained in Section 4.2. In particular, we
show how to treat each level-one exRec independently while maintaining valid upper bounds on the
error probabilities.
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4.3.1 Calculating the pseudo-threshold
One quantity that is particularly easy to calculate from our counts is the so-called pseudo-
threshold [SCCA06] for the CNOT location. The pseudo-threshold for location l is defined as
the solution to the equation p = p
(1)
l , where p
(1)
l is the probability that the 1-Rec for location l is
incorrect. We may compute a lower bound on the pseudo-threshold for CNOT by upper bounding
p
(1)
cnot ≤ Pr[bad|accept] +
∑
k
(
Pr[malX ,KX = k, good] + Pr[malZ ,KZ = k, good]
)
, (4.5)
where malX ≡ (malIX ∨malXI ∨malXX), malZ ≡ (malIZ ∨malZI ∨malZZ) and accept is the event
that all X-error and Z-error verifications in the CNOT exRec succeed.
The pseudo-threshold is is of practical interest for cases in which a finite failure probability is
acceptable and only a few levels of concatentation are desired. For example, when the physical
failure rate is sufficiently below the pseudo-threshold, the Golay code could be used to bootstrap
into other codes with lower overhead.
The pseudo-threshold is useful to us for two reasons. First, pseudo-threshold estimates have
been calculated for a variety of fault-tolerant quantum circuits including circuits based on the Golay
code [CDT09], and therefore serve as a reference for our counting results. Second, it was conjectured
by [SCCA06] that the pseudo-threshold is an upper bound on the asymptotic threshold. It thus
provides a reasonable target for our calculation of the asymptotic threshold lower bound, which
requires a noise strength maximum to be specified (see, in particular, Appendix D.2).
Pseudo-threshold results are listed in Table 7 and discussed in detail in Section 4.4.
4.3.2 Asymptotic threshold analysis
The asymptotic noise threshold is defined as the largest value γth such that, for all γ < γth, the
probability that the fault-tolerant simulation succeeds can be made arbitrarily close to one by using
sufficiently many levels of code concatenation. To prove a lower bound on the threshold we must
show, in particular, that the probability of an incorrect CNOT k-Rec decreases monotonically with k
for all γ < γth. Our counting technique gives an upper bound on the probability that a CNOT
1-Rec is incorrect. We now show how to upper bound incorrectness for level-two and higher and
therefore lower bound γth.
Consider an isolated level-one CNOT exRec. Let Pr[malE ] be the probability that the malignant
event malE occurs. For this event, the enclosed 1-Rec behaves as an encoded CNOT gate followed by
a two-block error that, when ideally decoded, leaves a two-qubit error E on the decoded state. Then
our counting technique provides upper bounds on Pr[malE ] for E ∈ {IX,XI,XX, IZ, ZI, ZZ}.
These upper bounds can be viewed as an error model for the CNOT 1-Rec in which the correlations
between X and Z errors are unknown.
We would now like to analyze the level-two CNOT exRec. Ideally, we could treat each 1-Rec
in the level-two simulation as a single “location” and use the error model obtained from level-
one to describe the probability of failure. Then level-two analysis could proceed by feeding this
“transformed” error model back into the counting procedure in order to compute Pr[malE ] for the
CNOT 2-Rec.
However, the transformed error model is based on analysis of an isolated level-one CNOT exRec.
A typical level-one simulation will contain many exRecs, and adjacent exRecs may share error
corrections at which point they can no longer be considered independently. For example, the
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Figure 8: Overlapping exRecs: exRec 1 shares one error correction with exRec 2 and one error correction
with exRec 3.
CNOT exRec in Figure 8 shares an error correction with both of the CNOT exRecs that follow
it. In [AGP06] (see also [Ali07]) this problem is solved by the following procedure known as level
reduction:
1. Examine exRec 2. If the enclosed rectangle is incorrect then replace the entire exRec with a
faulty version of the associated (level-zero) gate. Otherwise, replace the rectangle with an
ideal version of the associated gate.
2. Examine exRec 3. Follow the same procedure as for exRec 2.
3. Examine exRec 1. Depending on the outcomes of exRec 2 and exRec 3, one or both of the
TECs may have been removed. The enclosed rectangle now consists of the encoded CNOT
and any remaining TECs. If the remains of rectangle 1 are incorrect, exRec 1 is replaced with
a faulty level-zero gate. Otherwise, the rectangle is replaced with an ideal level-zero gate.
Level reduction allows the level-two analysis to proceed by treating each 1-Rec as a single
independent location. The probability that a “location” fails in the level-two simulation is upper
bounded by the probability that the corresponding 1-Rec is incorrect. The reason that level reduction
works when counting sets of malignant locations is because exRecs with incorrect rectangles are
replaced with faulty gates in the same way regardless of the malignant event that actually occurs.
The quantity used to bound incorrectness probability is strictly non-increasing as locations (i.e.,
TECs) are removed. To see this, consider sets of exRec locations of size k and denote the set of
all such sets by S. Let M ⊆ S be those sets for which some combination of nontrivial errors at
the k locations causes the rectangle to be incorrect (i.e., the malignant sets). The probability that
the rectangle is incorrect due to failures at exactly k locations is then no more than |M |pk. If an
error correction is removed from the exRec, some of the sets in M now contain fewer than k exRec
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LEC-A •
{X′, I′}
TEC-A
{X, I}
Figure 9: Upper block of the CNOT exRec. The error at the output of the TEC is either correctable (I), or
not (X). Similarly the error immediately preceding the TEC is either correctable (I′) or not (X′).
locations. The remaining sets with k exRec locations are those that do not contain a location in the
removed error correction. The number of such sets is at most |M | and so the original bound on the
incorrectness probability still holds.
The disadvantage to this approach for non-adversarial noise models is that it fails to consider
all of the available information. In particular, for a fixed set of malignant locations it assumes
the worst-case error for each location. The probability that a given set of k locations is actually
malignant can be significantly less than pk. To obtain a more accurate analysis of the second level,
we would like to replace each incorrect 1-Rec according to the malignant event that has actually
occurred.
Our transformed noise model of an isolated CNOT exRec provides upper bounds on the
probability of each type of malignant event, but we must show that that the bounds still hold when
exRecs overlap. Unfortunately, the bounds almost certainly will not hold. Consider, for example,
the control block of the CNOT exRec, shown in Figure 9. Assume that the error immediately
preceding the transversal CNOT is correctable (the error itself is not important). Let X be the event
that an uncorrectable X error exists on the output of the TEC and I be the event that the error on
the output is correctable. In other words X ≡ (malXI ∨malXX) and I ≡ ¬X. Then define X′ ≡ ¬I′
as the event that an uncorrectable X error exists on the block following the transversal CNOT but
before error correction. Pr[malXI ] will be non-increasing when removing the trailing error correction
only if Pr[X′] ≤ Pr[X]. On the other hand, Pr[malIX ] will be non-increasing only if Pr[I′] ≤ Pr[I].
Since Pr[X] + Pr[I] = Pr[X′] + Pr[I′] = 1, both conditions are satisfied only if Pr[X] = Pr[X′] and
Pr[I] = Pr[I′], which of course is highly unlikely.
In order to ensure a proper upper bound on each of the malignant event probabilities, we must
calculate upper bounds for the complete exRec and for incomplete exRecs in which one or more
trailing error corrections have been removed. Calculations for the complete exRec were discussed
in Section 4.2. Calculations for the incomplete exRecs are the same except that some of the TEC
components are not considered. Bounding the malignant event probability is a matter of finding a
polynomial that bounds all four cases (see Appendix D.2).
Once proper bounds on the level-one malignant event probabilities are determined, we would like
to plug the transformed error model into our counting procedure in order to determine the level-two
error probabilities. There are a few things to consider before doing so. First, part of the counting
strategy relies on using the correlations between X and Z errors in order to make corrections for
over-counting that occurs during postselection. The transformed error model, however, contains no
such correlation information, so these corrections must be omitted. Second, the CNOT malignant
event upper bounds do not contain information about rest, preparation or measurement locations.
Level-one error models for these locations can be computed using the same counting strategy as the
CNOT, but with an appropriately modified exRec.1
1Alternatively, they can be incorporated into the CNOT exRecs [AC07].
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Finally, in the depolarizing noise model, the error probabilities of each location are constant
multiples of the noise strength γ. Our upper bounds on the malignant event probabilities, however,
need not have any scalar relationship. For computer analysis, error probabilities must be re-
normalized in terms of γ and error weights recalculated as follows. Let P(1)E be our upper bound on
the level-one malignant event malE . Then construct a polynomial Γ
(1) and choose constants αE
such that
P(1)E (γ) ≤ αEΓ(1)(γ) (4.6)
for all E. The polynomial Γ(1) can be viewed as an effective noise strength “reference” for level-one.
Γ(1)(γ) is a function of γ, but we will usually denote it as Γ(1) for convenience of notation. Together
with weights αE , Γ
(1) defines a noise model similar to the depolarizing noise model defined in
Section 4.1. See Appendix D for details of the construction.
Now the new error model is input into the counting procedure and upper bounds on the level-two
error rates are computed. Let P(2)E (Γ) be the upper bound computed for malE at level-two. Then
we have the following conditions on the level-one and level-two malignant event probabilities:
Pr[mal
(1)
E ] ≤ P(1)E (γ) ≤ αEΓ(1)
Pr[mal
(2)
E ] ≤ P(2)E (Γ(1)) .
(4.7)
We also claim that P(2)E obeys the following property:
Claim 4.2. For 0 ≤  ≤ 1, P(2)E (Γ(1)(γ)) ≤ 4P(2)E (Γ(1)(γ)).
Proof of this claim is based on the form of the polynomials constructed by our counting
technique and the fact that our circuits are strictly fault-tolerant. Details of the proof are delegated
to Appendix D.3.
We are now in a position to establish conditions for a noise threshold, i.e., the conditions under
which the probability of a successful simulation can be made arbitrarily close to one.
Theorem 4.3. Let M be the set of all level-one CNOT, preparation, measurement and rest malig-
nant events consisting of: malIX , malXI , malXX , malIZ , malZI , malZZ , mal
prep
X , mal
prep
Z ,mal
meas
X ,
malmeasZ , mal
rest
X and mal
rest
Z . Also let P(1)E , P(2)E and Γ(1) be polynomials and αE constants as
discussed above. Then the tolerable noise threshold for depolarizing noise is lower bounded by the
largest value γth such that
P(2)E (Γ(1)(γth)) ≤ αEΓ(1)(γth) (4.8)
for all malE ∈M .
Proof. Assume that P(2)E (Γ(1)) < αEΓ(1), for all malE and γ ∈ (0, γth). Then, for a fixed γ ∈ [0, γth),
there exists some positive  < 1 such that, for all malignant events malE , P(2)E (Γ(1)) ≤ αEΓ(1).
By choosing Γ(2) := Γ(1) we obtain an effective noise model for level two in which the weights αE
are unchanged. Since our counting method depends only on the error weights, the polynomials that
upper bound the level-three malignant events will be the same as the polynomials that upper bound
the level-two malignant events. That is, P(3)E (Γ) = P(2)E (Γ). Thus,
Pr[mal
(3)
E ] ≤ P(3)E (Γ(2)) = P(2)E (Γ(1)) < 5αEΓ(1) , (4.9)
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Verification schedule CNOT Pseudothreshold Threshold
Steane-4 1.72× 10−3 1.24× 10−3
Overlap-4 1.73× 10−3 1.32× 10−3
Table 7: Threshold lower bounds for circuits based on our four-ancilla preparation and verification schedules
for the Golay code. Thresholds are given with respect to p the probability that a physical CNOT gate fails,
according to the depolarizing noise model defined in Section 4.1
.
where the last inequality follows from Claim 4.2. Repeating this process k times yields
Pr[mal
(k+1)
E ] ≤ P(k+1)E (Γ(k)) < 4k−3αEΓ(1) , (4.10)
which approaches zero in the limit of large k.
Testing of the assumption P(2)E (Γ(1)) < αEΓ(1) over a fixed interval (0, γth) is straightforward
because, as discussed in Appendix C, all of our malignant event polynomials (including Γ(1)) are
monotone non-decreasing up to sufficiently large values of γ.
4.4 Results: Threshold lower bounds
Threshold results were obtained by implementing our counting technique as a collection of modules
written in Python and C; the source code is available at [PR11]. Rigorous threshold lower bounds
for both of our four-ancilla preparation and verification circuits are given in Table 7. The main
program takes as input the four-ancilla preparation circuits, the noise model, and the good and
bad event settings. It outputs, for each type of exRec and each malignant event, a polynomial
representing an upper bound on the event probability. See Figure 10. These polynomials are either
evaluated directly to calculate the pseudo-threshold, or processed into a transformed error model
and fed back into the program.
The Python modules are broken up according to the components described in Section 4.2. The
main task for each component is, for each error equivalence class, to compute a weighted count of
location sets that produce that error. Counts for each component are obtained by first computing
counts for all of its sub-components and then convolving the results. Details are discussed in
Appendix B.
The most time-consuming part of the computation involves the CNOT exRec component.
Computing weighted counts for this component required a custom convolution with nearly four
trillion combinations. This part of the program was written in C to save time. Even so, running the
entire program to completion for a fixed ancilla preparation and verification schedule on 31 cores in
parallel took about four days.
Our thresholds compare favorably to threshold results for similar circuits. For a six-ancilla
preparation and verification circuit, Aliferis and Cross [AC07] give a threshold estimate based
on malignant set sampling of p ≈ 1 × 10−4 for adversarial noise. Our results beat this by an
order of magnitude and provide strong evidence that our counting technique is an improvement
over malignant set sampling and malignant set counting for the case of depolarizing noise. Our
results also essentially close the gap with other analytical and Monte Carlo threshold estimates
for depolarizing noise. Using a closed form analysis, Steane [Ste03] estimated a threshold on the
order of 10−3 for the Golay code with similar noise parameters. Cross et al. [CDT09] estimated a
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Figure 10: These plots show upper bounds on probability of malignant events for the different level-one
exRecs. The malIX , malXI , malXX , malIZ , malZI and malZZ events all pertain to the CNOT exRec; the
malprepX and mal
prep
Z events correspond to the |0〉 and |+〉 preparation exRecs, respectively; malmeasX and
malmeasZ correspond to Z-basis and X-basis measurement exRecs; mal
rest
X and mal
rest
Z pertain to the rest
exRecs. Note that the upper bound on malZI is significantly higher than that of its dual counterpart malIX .
This is due largely to the arbitrary choice in error correction to correct Z errors first and X errors second.
pseudo-threshold of 2.25× 10−3 based on Monte Carlo simulations of a twelve-ancilla preparation
and verification circuit.
Beyond circuits based on the Golay code, our results may be the highest rigorous threshold lower
bounds known. Aliferis and Preskill [AP09] prove a lower bound of p ≥ 1.25× 10−3. Their analysis
applies to teleportation-based gates due to Knill [Kni04b] in which Bell pairs encoded into an error
correcting code C2 are prepared by first encoding each qubit of the C2 block into an error detecting
code C1 and performing error detection and postselection after each step of the C2 encoding. Our
best threshold is only about 5 percent better, but apply to circuits that usually require far less
overhead (see Section 5.2). This implies only that in the depolarizing noise model our analysis is
more accurate, and not that our schemes tolerate more noise.
The limiting factor on the threshold value is the event malZI . That is, malZI is the event E for
which Pr[mal
(2)
E ] = Pr[mal
(1)
E ] takes the smallest value of p. In fact, the corresponding threshold
values for nearly all Z-error malignant events are lower than threshold values for any of the X-error
events. This asymmetry is due to the arbitrary order with which we perform error correction—Z
first, then X. Some X errors resulting from the leading Z-error correction will be corrected by
the X-error correction that follows. However, Z errors resulting from the X-error correction may
propagate through the encoded operation before arriving at the Z-error correction on the trailing
end. As a result, it is more likely for Z errors on individual blocks to be combined by the CNOT
gate and create an uncorrectable error. Evidence of this effect can be seen in the level-one malignant
event probabilities shown in Figure 10.
It should be possible to reduce such lopsided event probabilities by customizing the error
correction order for each EC based on the specifics of the ancilla preparation circuits. However,
analyzing such a scheme would require consideration of up to 36 different full or partial CNOT
exRecs (two choices for each EC) instead of four and is likely to yield only a small improvement
in the threshold. Note that other small improvements could be made by, for example, eliminating
23
0.0000 0.0005 0.0010 0.0015 0.0020
p
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
C
N
O
T
s
Overlap-4
Steane-4
Steane-12
(a)
0.0000 0.0005 0.0010 0.0015 0.0020
p
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
Q
u
b
it
s
Overlap-4
Steane-4
Steane-12
(b)
Figure 11: Overhead estimates for the twelve-ancilla ancilla preparation and verification circuit and for each
of our optimized circuits. (a) Expected number of CNOT gates required to produce a verified encoded |0〉. (b)
Number of qubits required to produce one verified encoded |0〉, in expectation, at every time step. Standard
error intervals are too small to be seen here.
measurement or rest exRecs at level-two. For simplicity, these optimizations were not considered.
5 Resource overhead
To evaluate the practical importance of our optimizations, we now analyze the resource requirements
of our fault tolerance scheme. In Section 5.1 we use Monte Carlo simulation to compare overhead of
our ancilla preparation and verification circuits to that of standard circuits. In Section 5.2 we use
threshold results from Section 4 to compute upper bounds on the resource overhead of our scheme
as a whole.
5.1 Simulation of the ancilla preparation overhead
One natural measure for the overhead is the number of CNOT gates used to ready an ancilla.
Another overhead measure, important given the difficulty of scaling quantum computers, is the
space complexity, i.e., the number of qubits that must be dedicated to ancilla preparation in a
pipeline so that an ancilla is always ready in time for error correction. We consider both measures.
As listed in the third column of Table 2, the overlap method-based four-ancilla preparation
and verification circuit involves roughly a factor of four fewer CNOT gates than the standard
twelve-ancilla circuit. In fact, this understates the improvement. The overhead also depends on
the acceptance rates of each verification test. For an ancilla to leave the twelve-ancilla circuit, it
must pass eleven tests, compared to only three tests for the four-ancilla circuit. The probability of
passing all tests should be significantly higher for the optimized circuit, and so one expects the ratio
between the expected numbers of CNOT gates used by the two circuits to be greater than four.
To estimate the expected overhead, each circuit was modeled and subjected to depolarizing noise
in a Monte Carlo computer simulation. We assumed that test results are available soon enough that
a failed verification circuit can be immediately aborted; later test failures are therefore the most
costly. This assumption impacts the twelve-ancilla circuits the most, since there are many ways to
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construct the hierarchy of verifications. The circuit shown in Figure 2 is a reasonable choice here
because only six of the verification tests depend on results of previous tests. Other circuits—see,
e.g., [Rei06, Sec. 2.3.2]—may contain as many as nine dependent tests.
Estimates of the expected number of CNOT gates required for each circuit are given in the
last column of Table 2 for the CNOT depolarization rate p = 10−3, and are plotted versus p in
Figure 11(a). At p = 10−3, the overlap method reduces the expected number of CNOT gates
by roughly a factor of 4.5, compared to the twelve-ancilla circuit, and the improvement for our
optimized Latin rectangle scheme is a factor of 3.6. At lower error rates, the improvement is less.
To investigate the effects of different error parameters, we also considered setting the rest error
rate to zero; in this case, the expected number of CNOT gates used in the overlap circuit further
decreases by about 11 percent, compared to less than four percent for our other four-ancilla circuit
and less than two percent for the twelve-ancilla circuit. The larger improvement for the overlap
circuit is due primarily to the fact that the overlap preparation method replaces many CNOT gates
with rest locations.
To evaluate the space overhead, we plot in Figure 11(b) the number of qubits required to
produce a single verified encoded |0〉, in expectation, per time step, for each of the preparation
and verification circuits. Thus, for example, the space overhead for a pipeline to produce a single
unverified ancilla state is 8 · 23 = 184 qubits; at any given time step, one 23-qubit block is initialized,
and CNOT gates are applied to seven other blocks—one per round in, e.g., Figure 4—so that one
ancilla is prepared. (In fact, the overhead is slightly less than this since some of the qubits in
the block can be prepared during rounds one and two.) Estimates are calculated recursively by
computing E[qubits] = (E[qubits]1 + E[qubits]2)/Pr[accept] for each verification step where the
numerator is the expected number of qubits required required to prepare the two states used in
that verification step and Pr[accept] is the probability that the verification measurement detects no
errors. The results at p = 10−3 are given in the second column of Table 2. Both of our optimized
schemes reduce the required space by a factor of 3.6 at p = 10−3.
To judge the significance of these results, recall that the ancilla production pipeline can consume
the majority of resources in a fault-tolerant quantum computer. In the case of [IWPK08], physical
ancilla production space is proportional to the number of CNOT gates in the pipeline. A factor
of 4.5 reduction in the CNOT overhead for ancilla preparation should give, very roughly, about a
50 percent improvement in the total footprint of the quantum computer.
5.2 Resource overhead upper bounds
The calculations above provide an estimate of the improvement of our ancilla preparation schemes
compared to the standard method. We would also like to understand the overhead for our scheme as
a whole. In this section we calculate upper bounds on the number of physical gates and the number
of physical qubits required to implement a single logical gate with a given effective error rate.
Our threshold analysis assumes that an infinite supply of ancilla qubits is available for use
in error correction. In order to bound the resource overhead we instead assume that some finite
number of ancillas are available to each k-EC. Error correction proceeds normally unless all ancilla
verifications fail. If the number of available ancillas is high enough, then the probability that all
verifications fail will be small and the impact on the logical errors will be similarly small.
More precisely, our approach is as follows. The ancilla verification circuit (Figure 6(c)) is
considered as a single unit. Each level-k Z-error correction consists of mk |0〉 verifications performed
in parallel plus a transversal rest, CNOT and X-basis measurement. If all of the mk verifications
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fail, then Z-error correction is aborted and the data is left idle. Level-k X-error correction is similar.
For simplicity, if any of the error corrections are aborted, then we consider the entire top-level
logical gate to have failed.
We need to bound the number of ancilla verifications for each level of concatenation. First,
bound Pr[¬accept](k) the probability of rejecting at level k.
Pr[¬accept](P(k)1 ,P(k)2 , . . .) ≤ Pr[¬accept](4(k−2)−3α1Γ, . . .)
≤ 4(k−2)−3 Pr[¬accept](2)
(5.1)
The first inequality follows from (4.10). The second follows from monotonicity and the form of
Pr[accept] (Appendix C).
Let ptarget be overall target error rate per logical gate, P(k) := maxi P(k)i , and let K be the
minimum level of concatenation that acheives P(k) < ptarget assuming an unbounded number of
ancilla. If Pr[fail(k)] is the probability that a Z-error correction fails then we require that
4 Pr[fail(k)] ≤ 4 Pr[¬accept]mk + 16mkAECZ Pr[fail(k−1)] ≤ δ(k) , (5.2)
where δ(k) = ptarget − P(k) and AECZ is the number of locations in a Z-error correction circuit.
The first term bounds the probability that all |0〉 verifications fail. The second term bounds the
probability that a (k − 1)-EC fails in any of the mk verifications. Multiplication by four on the
left-hand side accounts for the four X- and Z-error corrections in a CNOT rectangle. We must
divide δ(k) between the two terms. We could try to optimize the division, but the overhead is
dominated by the number of concatenation levels K and so the division is not terribly important.
Instead, we simply choose Pr[¬accept(k)]mk ≤ δ(k)/4k. Solving for mk we obtain,
mk ≤ log (δ
(k)/4k)
log Pr[¬accept(k)] . (5.3)
We may then compute mk−1 using
δ(k−1) =
δ(k) − δ(k)/4k
16mkAECZ
. (5.4)
Once we have a bound on mk for every k ≤ K, the total gate overhead g(k) for a k-Rec can be
computed recursively by g(k) ≤ (2mkAEC + 23) · g(k − 1).
Gate overhead upper bounds for the overlap-based scheme are shown in Figure 12(a). The
overhead increases dramatically as the target logical error rate decreases. However, compared to
similar upper bounds for the Fibonacci scheme—which has a similar threshold lower bound [AP09]—
our scheme is better for a wide range of error rates often by several orders of magnitude. One
reason for the improved overhead is that our scheme is based on a code with higher distance than
the Fibonacci scheme which uses the [[4, 2, 2]] error detecting code. The logical error rate for our
Golay scheme falls faster and thus requires fewer levels of concatentation.
Bounds on qubit overhead may be obtained from the gate overhead. Our threshold analysis
requires that all ancillas be ready on-demand without delay—i.e., each k-Rec has depth three,
independent of k. We, therefore, pessimistically assume that once a qubit is measured it cannot be re-
used within the same rectangle. The qubit overhead then depends only on the gate overhead and the
qubit-gate ratio for |0〉 verification. Using a ratio of 8·23/(AEC−46) we obtain q(k) ≤ 23k+0.15kg(k).
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(a) Golay scheme with overlap ancilla preparation
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Figure 12: Gate overhead upper bounds for (a) our Golay scheme with overlap ancilla preparation and
(b) the Fibonacci scheme presented in [AP09]. Each plot shows the number of physical gates required to
implement a logical gate with target error rates ptarget ∈ {10−12, 10−10, 10−9, 10−6}. Black text labels indicate
the required level of concatenation and colored lines are a guide for the eye.
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Figure 13: Qubit overhead upper bounds. Plots are formatted identically to Figure 12.
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Therefore, the level-k qubit overhead is roughly k orders of magnitude lower than the level-k gate
overhead.
The qubit-gate ratio for Bell-state preparation in the Fibonacci scheme is relatively large (≈ 0.6
for levels three and above). Therefore, similar to gate overhead, qubit overhead for the Golay scheme
compares favorably to the Fibonacci scheme for a wide range of noise parameters. See Figure 13.
The drawback of using a larger code is that the increase in overhead from one level of concatenation
to the next is much larger. This makes it harder to “tune” the overhead parameters to some specific
error rates. For example, for ptarget = 10
−10 and p = 10−6 our scheme requires two levels of
concatenation and about 108 physical gates per logical gate. For the same error rates, the Fibonacci
scheme requires three levels of concatenation, but fewer than 106 gates.
Finally, note that bounds for our scheme when ptarget = 10
−12 are a bit loose due to a constant
offset that is added during the transformed noise model construction (Appendix D.2). In our
computer analysis, these offsets were on the order of  ≈ 10−13. In principle, this offset does not
affect the actual error rates; rather it is an artifact of our construction.
6 Future work
We have shown two alternative circuits for the fault-tolerant preparation of Golay encoded ancillas.
Our circuits require a total of only four encoded ancillas, and thus out outperform the previous
best known circuits in terms of overhead. We have also demonstrated a new malignant set counting
technique and threshold analysis tailored specifically for depolarizing noise. With this technique, we
have proved a tolerable noise threshold of 1.32× 10−3, which may be the highest rigorous threshold
known.
There are a number areas for future work. First, using the overlap encoding method given in
Section 3.2, we were able to reduce the number of CNOT gates when compared to the standard
encoding procedure. However, the circuit given in Figure 4 was constructed by hand and is not
necessarily optimal. It would be ideal have an algorithm for finding a preparation circuit with the
fewest number of CNOT gates, while maintaining circuit depth bounds. Second, our techniques
for optimizing verification circuit overhead could be applied to other large codes. For example, the
self-dual BCH [[47, 1, 11]] and concatenated Steane [[49, 1, 9]] codes (see, e.g., [GB99]) are similar in
nature to the Golay code and may yield similar results. Variations of the verification procedure
could also be analyzed. Overhead might be reduced by, for example, attempting to correct some
errors detected during verification rather than always scrapping the entire preparation.
Another possible avenue of interest is to apply our malignant set counting technique to other
types of fault-tolerant error correction methods. In particular, the teleportation-based schemes due
to Knill are enticing candidates. Simulations indicate that these schemes can tolerate a depolarizing
noise rate as high as p = 1%. By dividing the exRec into small components, we may be able to count
larger sets of faulty locations and obtain a tighter bound. However, teleportation-based schemes
introduce new analytical challenges. In particular, unlike error-correction gadgets, error-detection
gadgets are non-deterministic. Our analysis assumed a trivial input syndrome to the exRec. For
non-deterministic exRecs, all possible input syndromes must be considered. Additionally, error
events must be conditioned on acceptance of all error-detection gadgets, not just those inside of the
exRec.
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A Component counting
A.1 Bounding bad events
Bad fault events are defined, in part, by establishing some limit kgood on the number of failures K
within the component. In the X-error case, |+〉 preparation and X-basis measurement locations are
ignored (they cannot produce X errors). For a component containing nc CNOT gates, nr rests, and
np + nm = npm |0〉 preparations and Z-basis measurements, let A~n and β~n(~k) and be defined as
A~n = (1− 12γ)nc(1− 8γ)nr(1− 4γ)npm
β~n(~k) =
(
nc
kc
)(
nr
kr
)(
npm
kpm
)
.
(A.1)
Then the probability of more than kgood X failures is
Pr[kgood < KX < kmax] = A~n
∑
kgood<|~k|<kmax
β~n(~k)
(
12γ
1− 12γ
)kc ( 8γ
1− 8γ
)kr ( 4γ
1− 4γ
)kpm
≤ A~n
∑
kgood<|~k|<kmax
β~n(~k)
(
γ
1− 12γ
)|~k|
12kc8kr4kpm .
(A.2)
The sums are over all possible failure partitions ~k = (kc, kr, kpm) for which |~k| = kc + kr + kpm is in
the correct range. The failure partition represents the number of CNOT failures kc, rest failures kr,
and preparation and measurement failures kpm = kp + km. The upper bound kmax is used to avoid
double counting between components and sub-components, and may be omitted in which case take
kmax = nc + nr + npm + 1. For components with a large number of locations, it is convenient to
approximate (A.2) by evaluating the sum up to only a fixed number of failures k′ = kgood + const.
and then upper bounding the rest of the sum by
Pr[k′ < KX ] ≤
∑
~k: |~k|=k′+1
β~n(~k)(12γ)
kc(8γ)kr(4γ)kpm . (A.3)
This bound is easy to compute, so long as the number of sub-components is reasonable, and is
better than the simpler bound ( nk′+1 ) (12γ)
k′+1.
The Z-error case is completely analogous except that now |+〉 and X-basis measurement locations
are counted and |0〉 preparation and Z-basis measurement locations are ignored. All of the equations
remain the same.
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Figure 14: X-error verification. The X-error verification component consists of two Golay encoded |0〉
preparations, a transversal CNOT and a transversal Z-basis measurement. X (χi) and Z (ζi) errors for each
part are labeled. The output is an X error χ and Z error ζ.
A.2 X-error verification
The X-error verification component is illustrated in Figure 14. It includes three sub-components that
fail independently. Let (χ1, ζ1) be the X and Z errors resulting from the first |0〉 preparation and
(χ2, ζ2) be the errors from the second |0〉 preparation. Let (χ3, ζ3) be the errors on the remaining
transversal CNOT and Z-basis measurement locations; we will denote by (χ′3, ζ ′3) the portion of
these errors on the control (upper) code block, and (χ′′3, ζ ′′3 ) the errors on the target (lower) code
block. Denote the final output errors by (χ, ζ).
Define sub-component j to be bad
(j)
Z if it contains five or more Z failures. If the sub-component
is not bad
(j)
Z , it is good
(j)
Z . Similarly define bad
(j)
X and good
(j)
X for X failures.
Define the X-error verification component to be “badZ” if any of the sub-components are bad
(j)
Z ,
or there are more than six Z failures. If the component is not badZ , it is goodZ . Similarly define
badX and goodX for X failures. Define the X-error verification component to be “best” if there are
fewer than four failures of any kind.
The quantities that we will compute for an X-error verification component are:
Pr[(χ, ζ) = (x, z),K = k, best|accept], Pr[χ = x,KX = k, goodX |accept],
Pr[ζ = z,KZ ≤ k, goodZ |accept], Pr[badX |accept] and Pr[badZ |accept] .
Here, for example, the first quantity is the probability of X-error x and Z-error z occurring with
exactly k failures and the best event, conditioned on X-error verification accepting (the event accept).
The second and third quantities are similar, except tracking only X or Z errors, respectively.
Begin by placing a lower bound on the probability of the event accept that noX errors are detected.
Define out(x) := {~x : x1x′3 ≡ x}, out(z) := {~z : z1z2z′3 ≡ z} and acceptX := {~x : x1x2x′′3 ≡ 0}. Use
Pr[accept] ≥ Pr[accept, goodX ] = 1− Pr[¬accept, goodX ]− Pr[badX ] (A.4)
and
Pr[¬accept, goodX ] ≤
∑
k≤6,|~k|=k
~x6∈acceptX
3∏
j=1
Pr[χj = xj ,KX,j = kj , good
(j)
X ] . (A.5)
Here, the sum is over all possible divisions ~k = (k1, k2, k3) of the number of failures among the three
sub-components, and of X errors that lead to a nontrivial syndrome measurement; it is a discrete
convolution of the error probabilities. Figure 18(a) shows computed lower bounds on Pr[accept] for
one particular ancilla preparation and verification circuit.
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The calculations we relate here and in the sequel are generally dictated by constraints of
combinatorial complexity. In Eq. (A.5), for instance, the number of terms in the sum is, na¨ıvely, on
the order of (212)4 · 36 ≈ 2× 1017, since there are 212 inequivalent X errors on a single code block.
Summing so many terms would be infeasible. In fact, though, the number of inequivalent X errors
produced by an ancilla preparation circuit with k ≤ 2 faults is much less than 212. For ancillas
prepared using Figure 4, there are 58 inequivalent X errors created with k = 1, and 1225 created
for k = 2. The number of inequivalent X errors for the transversal CNOT scales as
(
23
k
)
3k. Since
the number of possible partitions of k faults into m components is O(km), the worst case partition
with |~k| = 6, ~k = (1, 2, 3), involves only about 3× 109 error combinations. The bound in (A.5) can
therefore be computed with relative ease. This combinatorial analysis is very similar for the other
equations below.
We similarly compute for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3},
Pr[(χ, ζ) = (x, z),K = k, best, accept] =
∑
|~k|=k
~x∈out(x)∩acceptX
~z∈out(z)
3∏
j=1
Pr[(χj , ζj) = (xj , zj),Kj = kj ] , (A.6)
and for k ∈ {0, . . . , 6},
Pr[χ = x,KX = k, goodX , accept] =
∑
|~k|=k
~x∈out(x)∩acceptX
3∏
j=1
Pr[χj = xj ,KX,j = kj , good
(j)
X ] . (A.7)
It is more difficult to compute Pr[ζ = z,KZ = k, goodZ , accept] accurately. The na¨ıve bound
Pr[ζ = z,KZ = k, goodZ , accept] ≤ Pr[ζ = z,KZ = k, goodZ ] is quite poor, since X-error verification
catches many Z faults that occur with X faults, i.e., as a Y fault. The problem, though, is that we
lack X-error information with which to determine whether verification is successful or not. Therefore
we use instead the bound
Pr[ζ = z,KZ ≤ k, goodZ |accept] ≤
(
Pr[ζ = z,KZ ≤ k, goodZ ]
− Pr[ζ = z,K ≤ k, best,¬accept]
)
Pr[accept]
, (A.8)
which holds because best is a subset of goodZ . The numerator can be decomposed as
Pr[ζ = z,KZ ≤ k, goodZ ]− Pr[ζ = z,K ≤ k, best,¬accept] =
k∑
k′=0
P(z, k′) (A.9)
where
P(z, k) := Pr[ζ = z,KZ = k, goodZ ]−
∑
x
Pr[(χ, ζ) = (x, z),K = k, best,¬accept] . (A.10)
The first term of (A.10) represents the pessimistic assumption that all Z errors pass verification
under the Z-only noise model. It does not require any X-error information and may be computed
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k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6
Pr[ζ 6= 0,KZ = k, goodZ ] 0.1228 0.0101 0.0005 2× 10−5 6× 10−7 1× 10−8
Pr[ζ 6= 0,K = k, best,¬accept] 0.0614 0.0140 0.0012 - - -
Table 8: This table shows the (un-normalized) probability that a non-trivial Z error occurs during X-error
verification of |0〉1 for the Overlap-4 verification schedule, evaluated at p = 10−3. The first row gives upper
bounds on the probability of a nontrivial Z-error under the Z-only noise model, assuming that all Z errors
pass verification. The second row gives lower bounds on the correction applied in (A.8) based on the full
depolarizing noise model.
in the same way as Eqs. (A.6) and (A.7):
Pr[ζ = z,KZ = k, goodZ ] =
∑
|~k|=k
~z∈out(z)
3∏
j=1
Pr[ζj = zj ,KZ = kj , good
(j)
Z ] . (A.11)
The second term uses the full XZ noise model and corrects the over-counting of the first term by
subtracting off most of correlated Z errors that are rejected. It is nearly identical to (A.6) except
that the rejected errors are counted instead of the accepted errors. It is computed as
Pr[(χ, ζ) = (x, z),K = k, best,¬accept] =
∑
|~k|=k
~x∈out(x)\acceptX
~z∈out(z)
3∏
j=1
Pr[(χj , ζj) = (xj , zj),Kj = kj ]. (A.12)
To get a quantitative estimate of the significance of this correction, we show in Table 8 the sum
of (A.11) and (A.12) over all nontrivial Z errors for p = 10−3. From this table, we compute a ratio
Pr[ζ 6= 0, best,¬accept]/Pr[ζ 6= 0, goodZ ] of about 0.57, indicating that, as expected, the correction
cuts the probability of a Z error roughly in half. First-order quantities account for most of the
correction. Third-order quantites are negligible, providing further justification for our choice of
kbest = 3.
We see from Figure 18(a) that the lower bound on Z-error verification acceptance at p = 10−3 is
about 0.84. The correction eliminates better than half of the Z errors going into Z-error verification,
so we crudely estimate a lower bound without the correction of about 0.63, a decrease by a factor
of 1.3. There are four Z-error verifications of encoded |0〉 in the (full) exRec and four similar X-error
verifications of encoded |+〉. Thus, in the normalization factor alone, the correction reduces upper
bounds on the malignant event probabilities (see (A.24)) by roughly a factor of 1.38 ≈ 8. The
savings is less, of course, as p decreases.
Finally, bound the probability of the badX event by Pr[badX ] ≤ Pr[KX > 6]+
∑
j Pr[bad
(j)
X ], and
use Pr[badX |accept] ≤ Pr[badX ]/Pr[accept]. The probability of the badZ event is similarly bounded.
A.3 Z-error verification
The Z-error verification component is illustrated in Figure 15 with its three labeled independent
sub-components. Define the component to be badX if any of the sub-components are badX or there
are more than seven X failures. The badX events for sub-components one and two are defined
in Appendix A.2 and bad
(3)
X occurs when component three contains more than four X failures.
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Figure 15: Z-error verification. The Z-error verification component consists of two X-error-verified ancillas,
two transversal rest operations, a transversal CNOT and a transversal X-basis measurement.
Thus Pr[badX ] ≤ Pr[K > 7] +
∑3
j=1 Pr[bad
(j)
X ]. Similarly define badZ for Z failures. Also define
out(x) := {~x : x1x2x′3 ≡ x}, out(z) := {~z : z1z′3 ≡ z} and acceptZ := {~z : z1z2z′′3 ≡ 0}.
Begin by placing a lower bound on the acceptance probability Pr[accept] conditioned on accep-
tance of both X-error verifications. As in the X-error verification component, we use an estimate
based on the good events only:
Pr[accept|accept(1,2)] ≥ Pr[accept, goodZ |accept(1,2)]
= 1− Pr[¬accept, goodZ |accept(1,2)]− Pr[badZ |accept(1,2)]
(A.13)
Pr[¬accept, goodZ |accept(1,2)] =
∑
~z 6∈acceptZ
|~k|≤7

Pr[ζ3 = z3,KZ,3 = k3, good
(3)
Z ]
·
2∏
j=1
Pr[ζj = zj ,KZ,j = kj , good
(j)
Z
|accept(j)]

≤
∑
~z 6∈acceptZ
|~k|≤7

Pr[ζ3 = z3,KZ,3 = k3, good
(3)
Z ]
·
2∏
j=1
Pj(zj , kj)
Pr[accept(j)]
 ,
(A.14)
where Pj is defined according to (A.10).
Now consider Z errors, the simpler case. We have
Pr[ζ = z,KZ ≤ k, goodZ , accept|accept(1,2)] ≤
∑
~z∈out(z)∩acceptZ
|~k|≤min{k,7}

Pr[ζ3 = z3,KZ,3 = k3, good
(3)
Z ]
·
2∏
j=1
Pj(zj , kj)
Pr[accept(j)]
 . (A.15)
We upper-bound Pr[ζ = z,KZ ≤ k, goodZ |accept, accept(1,2)] by the minimum of one and the ratio
of Pr[ζ = z,KZ ≤ k, goodZ , accept|accept(1,2)] divided by the previously computed lower bound on
Pr[accept|accept(1,2)].
Next consider X errors. Under the X-only noise model, we have no information about Z errors
and we must pessimistically assume that all X errors pass verification (i.e., Pr[χ, accept] = Pr[χ]).
In reality, some of the X errors will occur with Z errors and will be rejected. In the same way
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Figure 16: The error correction component. Error correction consists of a Z-error correction followed by an
X-error correction. The Z-error correction requires a verified encoded |0〉 ancilla and the X-error correction
requires a verified encoded |+〉 ancilla.
that corrections were applied for Z-error counts during X-error verification, we apply low-order
corrections to the X-error counts by considering X and Z errors together. In a similar manner to
Eq. (A.8) we have
Pr[χ = x, goodX , accept|accept(1,2)]
≤ Pr[χ = x, goodX , accept
(1,2)]− Pr[χ = x, best,¬accept, accept(1,2)]
Pr[accept(1)] Pr[accept(2)]
.
(A.16)
The numerator terms on the right-hand side can be computed as
Pr[χ = x, goodX , accept
(1,2)] =
∑
~x∈out(x)
|~k|≤7
3∏
j=1
Pr[χj = xj ,KX,j = kj , good
(j)
X , accept
(j)] (A.17)
Pr[(χ, ζ) = (x, z), best,¬accept, accept(1,2)] = (A.18)∑
~z∈out(z)\acceptZ
~x∈out(x),|~k|≤1
3∏
j=1
Pr[(χj , ζj) = (xj , zj),Kj = kj , accept
(j)] .
Equation (A.16) is then upper bounded by upper bounding (A.17), lower bounding Pr[accept(1)] and
Pr[accept(2)], and computing (A.18) with equality, all of which can be accomplished with quantities
from Appendix A.2.
This correction is less significant than the similar correction applied in X-error verification.
By the time Z-error verification occurs, many of the X-errors have already been eliminated by
X-error verification. The X errors that do pass verification are less correlated with Z errors; the
correction eliminates only about 39 percent of the nontrivial X errors compared to about 57 percent
for the analogous X-error verification correction. Furthermore, this correction has no effect on
normalization because acceptance at this stage depends only on Z errors, and there are no further
postselection steps in the exRec.
A.4 Error correction
The error correction component (Figure 16) contains four independent sub-components. The badX
events for sub-components one and two are defined in Appendix A.3. The badX event for sub-
components three and four occur when there are more than four failures inside of the sub-component.
Define the error correction component to be badX if any of the sub-components are badX or there
are more than eleven X failures total. Similarly define badZ for Z failures.
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All events are conditioned on the successful verification of both the |0〉 and |+〉 ancillas. We have
Pr[badX |accept(1,2)] ≤
2∑
j=1
Pr[bad
(j)
X |accept(j)] +
4∑
j=3
Pr[bad
(j)
X ] + Pr[KX > 11] . (A.19)
Here, accept(j) means that all verification tests, X and Z, within that subcomponent have passed.
Consider first X errors. For the two leading error corrections, we are concerned only with the
case in which the incoming error syndrome is zero. Nonzero syndromes on the input may result in a
(undetectable) logical error at the output. However, as noted in Section 4.2.4, this has no impact on
either the output syndrome or the correctness of the 1-Rec. The probability of an X error x at the
output is expressed as Pr[χout = x, good|χin ≡ 0].
For the two trailing error corrections, we must consider all possible inequivalent errors on the
input. However, we do not need to compute the probability of each individual error at the output.
Rather, we care only about the the probability of an uncorrectable error. Let E be the set of
correctable errors on a single block and E¯ be the set of uncorrectable errors, and for an error e, let
D(e) =
{
1 if e ∈ E¯
0 if e ∈ E . (A.20)
We use, for d ∈ {0, 1},
Pr[D(χout) = d, goodX |χin = xin] ≤
∑
x:D(x)=d
Pr[χout = x, goodX |χin = xin] . (A.21)
The terms of the sum may be expanded as usual by partitioning k failures among the sub-
components of the EC. Define out(x) := {~x : xinx1x′3x′4Corr(xinx1x2x′3x′′4) ≡ x}, where Corr(·) gives
the classically computed correction for the syndrome of its argument. Then
Pr[χout = x,KX ≤ k, goodX |χin = xin] =
∑
~x∈out(x)
|~k|≤11
4∏
j=1
Pr[χj = xj ,KX,j = kj , good
(j)
X ] , (A.22)
which can be upper bounded using quantities from Appendix A.3. Calculations for Z errors are
analogous except using out(z) := {~z : zinz2z′3z′4Corr(zinz1z′′3 ) ≡ z}.
A.5 exRec
The exRec is divided into five sub-components: the leading error correction on block A (LEC-A), the
leading error correction on block B (LEC-B), the transversal CNOT from block A to block B, the
trailing error correction on block A (TEC-A) and the trailing error correction on block B (TEC-B).
See Figure 17.
The badX event for the error correction sub-components is defined in Appendix A.4. The badX
event for the transversal CNOT occurs when it contains more than two X failures. The badX event
for the exRec (and analogously the badZ event) occurs when any of the following are true:
• Any of the sub-components are badX .
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Figure 17: The CNOT exRec consists of two leading error corrections, a transversal CNOT with controls on
block A and targets on block B, and two trailing error corrections. Incremental errors for the LECs and the
CNOT are labeled, as are the total errors at the output of each block.
• There are more than 25 X failures in the exRec.
• There is more than one X failure in the transversal CNOT and there are more than than
three X failures in each of the two leading ECs.
The last condition eliminates faults that are particularly difficult to count. The time required
to count an exRec fault is proportional to the product of the number of unique syndromes that
can result at the output of the two leading ECs and the transversal CNOT. The number of unique
syndromes that can result from the transversal CNOT with two X failures is ( 232 ) 3
2 = 2277, while
the number of unique syndromes with one X failure is 23 ·3 = 69. The numbers of unique syndromes
at the output of the leading ECs are 24, 277 and 2048 for one, two, and three X failures respectively.
So, for example, the event KX,1 = 2,KX,2 = 3,KX,3 = 1 (277 · 2048 · 69 ≈ 4 · 107) requires far less
time than the event KX,1 = 2,KX,2 = 3,KX,3 = 2 (277 · 2048 · 2277 ≈ 1 · 109). In particular, we
would like to avoid counting faults for which KX,3 = 2.
The probability of the badX event, conditioned on acceptance of all X-error and Z-error
verifications is
Pr[badX |accept(1,2,4,5)] ≤
∑
j∈{1,2,4,5}
Pr[bad
(j)
X |accept(j)] + Pr[bad(3)X ] + Pr[KX > 25]
+ Pr[KX,3 > 1]
2∏
j=1
Pr[KX,j > 3|accept(j)] .
(A.23)
Computed upper bounds for this quantity are plotted in Figure 18(b). Na¨ıvely one might expect
bounds for partial exRecs—those for which one or more TECs have been removed—to be lower
than bound for the full exRec by as much as a factor of two. However, (A.23) is dominated by
either the transversal CNOT (Pr[bad
(3)
X ]) or the condition involving the transversal CNOT and the
two LECs (Pr[KX,3 > 1]
∏2
j=1 Pr[KX,j > 3|accept(j)]) over most of the domain of p. Thus removing
the TECs has little impact on the probability that the exRec is bad.
Recall from (A.20) the definition of D : (E ∪ E¯) → {0, 1}. For ~x = (x1, x2, x3, x′out, x′′out) and
~z = z1, z2, z3, z
′
out, z
′′
out), we can then define the malignant X- and Z-error events for the CNOT
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Figure 18: Plotted in (a) are lower bounds on the Overlap-4 acceptance probabilities for the two X-error
verifications (accept(1) and accept(2)) and for the Z-error verification (accept) conditioned on success of the
X-error verifications. The plot in (b) shows upper bounds on (A.23), the probability that the CNOT exRec
is bad.
1-Rec as
malIX(~x) :=
[
D(x1) = D(x
′
out)
] ∧ [D(x1)⊕D(x2) 6= D(x′′out)]
malXI(~x) :=
[
D(x1) 6= D(x′out)
] ∧ [D(x1)⊕D(x2) = D(x′′out)]
malXX(~x) :=
[
D(x1) 6= D(x′out)
] ∧ [D(x1)⊕D(x2) 6= D(x′′out)]
malIZ(~z) :=
[
D(z1)⊕D(z2) = D(z′out)
] ∧ [D(z2) 6= D(z′′out)]
malZI(~z) :=
[
D(z1)⊕D(z2) 6= D(z′out)
] ∧ [D(z2) = D(z′′out)]
malZZ(~z) :=
[
D(z1)⊕D(z2) 6= D(z′out)
] ∧ [D(z2) 6= D(z′′out)] .
(A.24)
These are the events for which the behavior of the 1-Rec differs from the behavior of an ideal decoder
followed by an ideal (level-zero) CNOT gate, i.e., the 1-Rec is incorrect. The subscripts denote the
logical error introduced by the exRec. For example, malIX is the event in which the action of the
exRec followed by an ideal decoder is the same as that of an ideal decoder followed by an ideal
CNOT gate plus the two-qubit error error I ⊗X.
For each error event E ∈ {IX,XI,XX}, we are interested in the probability that malE(~χ)
occurs along with the goodX event. Define G := {~k : |~k| ≤ 25, k3 ≤ 1 if k1 ≥ 4 and k2 ≥ 4}. Then,
letting χ′in and χ
′′
in be the errors input to the two TECs,
Pr[malE(~χ), goodX ] =
∑
~x:malE(~x)
~k∈G

3∏
j=1
Pr[χj = xj ,KX,j = kj , good
(j)
X ]
·Pr[χ′out = x′out,KX,4 = k4, good(4)X |χ′in ≡ x1x′3]
·Pr[χ′′out = x′′out,KX,5 = k5, good(5)X |χ′′in ≡ x1x2x′′3]
 , (A.25)
which may be upper bounded using quantities from Appendix A.4. Calculation of Pr[malE(~ζ), goodZ ]
for E ∈ {IZ, ZI, ZZ} is analogous.
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B Implementation of component counting
Equations (A.23) and (A.25) in Appendix A are conceptually straightforward and easy to compute
numerically for a fixed γ. However, we would like to compute exact bounds that hold for a range
of γ. In this appendix, we will specify a few of the implementation details that allow for maintaining
the bounds as polynomials with integer coefficients.
The ultimate goal is to compute upper bounds on the probabilities of malignant events at the
outermost layer of the exRec. That is, we want to compute (A.23), (A.25) and combine them to get
Pr[malE(~χ)|accept] ≤ Pr[malE(~χ), goodX |accept] + Pr[badX |accept] . (B.1)
The right-hand side of this inequality decomposes into sums of individual component quantities of
the form
Pr[χ = x,KX = k] =
∑
|~k|=k
Pr[χ = x, ~KX = ~k] , (B.2)
where ~k = (kc, kr, kp, km) expresses the number of failing CNOT, rest, |0〉 preparation and Z-basis
measurements, respectively.
For each term in the sum, the number of failures for each type of location is fixed, but the
particular locations on which those failures occur are not fixed, nor are the errors that occur at
those locations. Let L(~k) := {(~lc,~lr,~lp,~lm) : (|~lc|, |~lr|, |~lp|, |~lm|) = ~k} be the set of all possible tuples
of failing locations consistent with ~k. Also, let E(~l) be the set of all possible tuples of X errors
consistent with failures at locations ~l. To fix the locations and the errors, use
Pr[χ = x, ~KX = ~k] =
∑
~l∈L(~k),~e∈E(~l)
Pr[χ = x, ~E = ~e]
=
∑
~l∈L(~k),~e∈E(~l)
F(x,~e) Pr[ ~E = ~e]
(B.3)
where in the second line we have made the substitution F(x,~e) = Pr[χ = x| ~E = ~e].
The boolean function F(x,~e) takes value one if the component produces the error x for a given
“configuration” of errors ~e and value zero otherwise. The error configuration ~e fully specifies the
the locations that have failed and the error at each failing location. Let nc, nr, np, nm be the total
number of CNOT, rest, |0〉 preparations and Z-basis measurements in the component, respectively.
Then from the marginal noise model discussed in Section 4.1 we have
Pr[ ~E = ~e] = (1− 4γ)np+nm(1− 8γ)nr(1− 12γ)nc
·
( 4γ
1− 4γ
)kp+km( 8γ
1− 8γ
)kr( 4γ
1− 12γ
)kc
≤ A~n4k2kr
( γ
1− 12γ
)k
,
(B.4)
where A~n is defined as in (A.1). This inequality is a reasonable approximation for the range
γ ≤ 2×10−315 with which we are concerned. It allows us to move γ into a prefactor in front of the
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sum of (B.2), and permits an integer representation in the computer analysis. Indeed, substituting
back into equation (B.2) gives
Pr[χ = x,KX = k] ≤ A~n
( γ
1− 12γ
)k ∑
|~k|=k
~l∈L(~k),~e∈E(~l)
4k2krF(x,~e) . (B.5)
X- and Z-error verification require corrections that involve counting X and Z errors together
(Appendix A.2). In that case, the probability of an error configuration is computed according to
Definition 4.1 and we require a lower bound. We have
Pr[ ~E = ~e] = (1− 4γ)n′p+n′m(1− 12γ)nr(1− 15γ)nc
·
( 4γ
1− 4γ
)kp+km( 4γ
1− 12γ
)kr( γ
1− 15γ
)kc
≥ A′(~n′)4kp+km+kr
( γ
1− 4γ
)k
= A~n
(A′(~n′)
A~n
)( γ
1− 12γ
)k(1− 12γ
1− 4γ
)k
4kp+km+kr
≥ A~n
( γ
1− 12γ
)kS4kp+km+kr .
(B.6)
Here, n′p and n′m are the total numbers of preparation and measurement locations (including now |+〉
preparations and X-basis measurements), and A′(~n′) = (1− 4γ)n′p+n′m(1− 12γ)nr(1− 15γ)nc . The
scaling factor S = ⌊A′(~n′)A~n (1−12γmax1−4γmax )k⌋ converts the XZ probability into a form that is compatible
with X-only and Z-only probabilities (Eq. (B.4)) while maintaining the lower bound and integer
representation. The constant γmax is chosen so that it is higher than the expected threshold value.
Now, (A.8) and (A.16) can be rewritten so that the sums do not depend on γ, and terms with
corrections such as (A.10) can be represented by a single integer.
Another advantage of counting component probabilities as likelihoods, is that the counts compose
nicely. If we apply (B.2) to itself and combine with (B.5), we end up with
Pr[χ = x,KX = k] =
∑
|~k|=k
~x∈out(x)
∏
j
Pr[χj = xj ,KX,j = kj ]
≤ A~n
( γ
1− 12γ
)k[ ∑
|~k|=k
~x∈out(x)
∏
j
∑
|~kj |=kj
~l∈L(~kj),~e∈E(~l)
4kj2kj,rF(xj , ~e)
]
.
(B.7)
The substitution made in the first line can be applied successively for each sub-component j.
Once the lowest level component is reached, we use (B.5) to push dependence on γ outside of the
sum. The integer value inside of the brackets is the discrete convolution of weighted counts from
the sub-components summed over all possible failure partitions ~k of size k. It is a weighted count of
all possible ways to produce error x with an order k fault.
The primary task of the Python program is to compute F for each (good) error configuration,
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starting with the lowest level component, and to store the resulting weighted sums∑
|~k|=k
~l∈L(~k),~e∈E(~l)
4k2krF(x,~e) (B.8)
(or equivalent) for use in the counting for larger components. At each level, counts for the sub-
components are convolved to generate new counts. The prefactor A~n
( γ
1−12γ
)k
need only be computed
at the end, when calculating the threshold.
C Monotonicity of malignant event upper bounds
We now show how to prove that the level-one malignant event polynomials constructed by our
counting method are monotone non-decreasing over the interval γ ∈ [0, 1.8×10−3], which encompasses
our threshold values. Monotonicity of level-one upper bounds is not strictly required for the proof
of Theorem 4.3. However, it is useful constructing the transformed noise model (see Appendix D.2)
and in finding the maximum γ that satisfies P(2)E (Γ(1)) ≤ αEΓ(1). Monotonicity of upper bounds for
level-two and above follow from Claim 4.2 which depends only on the construction defined by our
counting method and not on the actual counting results—see Appendix D.3. Level-one polynomials,
however, can include terms that decrease with γ. Monotonicity statements for level-one bounds,
therefore, depend on coefficients—i.e., weighted counts—computed by our Python implementation.
Recall that the upper bound PE for malignant event malE as defined by Appendix A is of the
form
PE ≥ Pr[malE , good]
Pr[accept]
+ Pr[bad|accept] . (C.1)
Consider first the Pr[bad|accept] term. This term is expressed as sums and products of Pr[bad]
terms, some of which contain Pr[accept] terms in the denominator. The Pr[bad] and Pr[accept]
terms are, in turn, expressed as sums and products of polynomials Q of the form
Q(γ) = A~n(γ)
kmax∑
k=kmin
c(k)
( γ
1− 12γ
)k
, (C.2)
where Q(γ) ≥ 0 for all γ ≥ 0, and integer coefficients c(k) do not depend on γ. The quantity
Pr[malE , good] is also expressed in this way. Our goal then is to use (C.2) to show that Pr[accept]
is monotone non-increasing, and that Pr[bad] and Pr[malE , good]/Pr[accept] are monotone non-
decreasing over the desired range. Note that Pr[malE , good] is, in fact, not monotone over our
chosen range.
The derivative of Q is a sum of two terms. The first term can be lower-bounded by using
dA~n
dγ
kmax∑
k=kmin
c(k)
( γ
1− 12γ
)k
=
( −12nc
1− 12γ −
8nr
1− 8γ −
4npm
1− 4γ
)
A~n
∑
k
c(k)
( γ
1− 12γ
)k
≥ −(12nc + 8nr + 4npm) Q(γ)
1− 12γ .
(C.3)
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If all coefficients c(k) are non-negative, then the second term may be lower-bounded as
A~n
∑
k
c(k)
d
dγ
( γ
1− 12γ
)k ≥ kmin
γmax
Q(γ)
1− 12γ . (C.4)
In the case of Pr[bad], all of the coefficients c(k) are, indeed, non-negative. Using γmin = 0, and
kmin = kgood + 1 we obtain
dPr[bad]
dγ
≥
(kgood + 1
γmax
− 12nc − 8nr − 4npm
)Pr[bad]
1− 12γ , (C.5)
which is non-negative over [0, 1.8× 10−3] for all of our components.
We would like to upper bound the denominator quantities Pr[accept] using a condition analogous
to (C.5). Such a condition is insufficient, however, because for X-error verification kmin = 0, and for
Z-error verification some coefficients may be negative due to low-order XZ corrections. Instead, we
bound the second derivative using the following inequality due to Markov.
Lemma C.1 (see, e.g., [Haz90] pp. 100). Let Q be a univariate polynomial of degree at most n.
Then the m-th order derivative Q(m) is bounded by
max
γ∈[γmin,γmax]
|Q(m)(γ)| ≤ 2
m
∏m−1
k=0 (n
2 − k2)
(γmax − γmin)m(2m− 1)!! maxγ∈[γmin,γmax] |Q(γ)| . (C.6)
In our case, n is bounded by the number of locations in the corresponding component. The
maximum of Q is obtained by separating the positive and negative coefficients and upper bounding by
max
γ∈[γmin,γmax]
Q(γ) ≤ A~n(γ)
kmax∑
k=kmin
max{c(k), 0}γkmax
(1− 12γmax)k +
min{c(k), 0}γkmin
(1− 12γmin)k . (C.7)
If ∆ is the bound obtained from Lemma C.1, then the first derivative can be bounded using
max
γ∈[γmin,γmax]
Q(1) ≤ Q(1)(γmin) + ∆(γmax − γmin) . (C.8)
Depending on the values of the coefficients c(k), bounding the first derivative below zero may require
dividing up the interval into smaller sub-intervals and successively applying (C.8).
Analysis for Q = Pr[malE , good]/Pr[accept] is similar. Monotonicity over the range [, γmax] for
small constant  can be shown by using the lower bound equivalent of (C.8). The maximum of Q is
calculated by using (C.7) on Pr[malE , good] and evaluating Pr[accept] at γmax. Lower bounding the
first derivative in this way is not adequate for [0, ], however, because the first derivative vanishes at
γ = 0. Due to the strict fault-tolerance of our circuits, coefficients c(k) of Pr[malE , good] are zero
for 0 ≤ k ≤ 3 and so the derivatives up to third order are also zero. To show monotonicity over [0, ]
we evaluate the fourth derivative at γ = 0 and then use Lemma C.1 to bound the fifth derivative.
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D The transformed noise model
D.1 Construction of the model
The transformed noise model uses upper bounds on the level-one malignant event probabilities to
model each 1-Rec as a single effective “location” in the level-two simulation. The construction here
considers only X-error malignant events. Construction for Z-error events is nearly identical, and the
upper bounds obtained from level-one counting contain no information about X and Z correlations
so X and Z errors are not considered together at level-two.
From level-one counting, we have upper bounds on Pr[malIX ], Pr[malXI ], and Pr[malXX ] of
the transversal CNOT, Pr[malprepX ] of encoded |0〉 preparation, Pr[malmeasX ] of transversal Z-basis
measurement and Pr[malrestX ] of the transversal rest. Each of these bounds is a polynomial in γ,
the probability of a given error on a physical CNOT (see Figure 10(a)). Denote the upper bound
polynomial for each event malE by PE . Then let ΓX(γ) be a polynomial defined over the interval
0 ≤ γ ≤ γmax such that, for all malE ,
PE(γ) ≤ αEΓX(γ) (D.1)
where αE ≥ 1 is a constant. The procedure for obtaining such a polynomial ΓX and constants αE
is outlined in the Section D.2.
Now consider the level-two simulation. Level-two rectangles are composed of many level-one
rectangles. Following [AGP06] we replace each 1-Rec with an implementation of the corresponding
(level-zero) gate, starting with the right-most 1-Recs and moving left. If a 1-Rec is correct, then
it is replaced with an ideal gate. If a 1-Rec is incorrect, then the entire exRec is replaced with a
faulty version of the gate. Unlike [AGP06], however, exRecs containing incorrect rectangles are
replaced according to the malignant event that occurred. For example, a CNOT 1-Rec that is
malIX is replaced with an ideal CNOT gate followed by the error I ⊗X. A 1-Rec (A) that precedes
an incorrect 1-Rec (B) is replaced with a faulty gate only if A is still incorrect after the ECs
shared with the exRec containing B have been removed. Such an incorrect 1-Rec (A) is said to be
“independently” incorrect.
Let K1,K2,K3,K4,K5 be the number of level-one exRecs that are independently malIX , malXI ,
malXX , mal
prep
X , mal
meas
X and mal
rest
X , respectively. Then the probability Pr[
~K = ~k] of this event is
bounded by
Pr[ ~K = ~k] ≤ ΓX(γ)|~k|
6∏
i=1
dαieki (D.2)
where the ceiling is taken to allow integer representation in the computer analysis. Thus, characteri-
zation and analysis of the level-two components is similar to that used for the depolarizing noise
model in Section A except that the weights associated with each type of error are different. There
is also no prefactor A~n in (D.2) as there is in (B.4). This is because the error probabilities are now
specified as upper bounds rather than equalities. We do not have a proper upper bound, other than
one, for the probability that a location (1-Rec) does not fail.
D.2 Bounding malignant event polynomials
Construction of the transformed noise model requires bounding of several sets of polynomials in two
different ways. The first case compares polynomials of a fixed malignant event for each possible
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Figure 19: The above plots show upper bounds on the probability of malignant events for the level-one CNOT
exRec where the error corrections are based on Overlap-4 verification schedule. Upper bounds are plotted
separately for each of four different CNOT exRecs: the full exRec (labeled AB), and the three incomplete
exRecs in which the TEC on block A—the control block—has been removed (-B), the TEC on block B—the
target block—has been removed (A-) or the TEC on both blocks have been removed (--). Also shown is the
polynomial “max” used to simultaneously upper bound all four possibilities (see Section 4.3.2).
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partial CNOT exRec (see Figure 19). In this case, we require only a single polynomial P∗ which
is strictly greater than or equal to all other polynomials in the set P := {PE} over the interval
[0, γmax]. The monotonicity of each of the polynomials (see Section C) over this interval means that
constructing a P∗ is relatively simple. First, choose some reasonably small γmin > 0 and fix some
∆ > 0. Then a sufficient condition for P∗ to be greater than all polynomials in P over the interval
[γmin, γmax] is
P∗(γmin + n∆) ≥ PE(γmin + (n+ 1)∆) (D.3)
for all PE ∈ P and all integers 0 ≤ n ≤ d(γmax − γmin)/∆e. P∗ can be constructed by taking the
PE with the largest value at γmax (say), and adding a constant offset of at least maxE PE(γmin) so
that (D.3) is satisfied. Maximality over the remaining interval [0, γmin] follows by monotonicity.
In the second case, we compare malignant events from different types of exRecs. We need to
construct Γ and determine values αE for which the upper bound PE ≤ αEΓ in (D.1) is satisfied.
Construction of Γ is similar to that of P∗ from above. Let Pj be the polynomial with the largest
derivative at γmax. Take Pj and divide by some appropriately large value r. Then add a constant
offset  := maxi 6=j Pi(γmin) so that Γ = Pj/r + . Finally, for each malE , find the minimum value of
αE such that P∗ := αEΓ satisfies condition (D.3).
In practice, the quality of the resulting bounds depends on the choice of γmin and the number of
plotted points n. We find that a value of γmin = γmax/10 or γmin = γmax/100, and n = 1000 works
well. More sophisticated methods can also be used. For example, the value of ∆ could vary over the
interval to better capture exponential behavior of the polynomials.
D.3 Proof of Claim 4.2
We conclude our analysis of the transformed error model by proving Claim 4.2 that the level-two
malignant event upper bounds decrease exponentially with γ.
Proof. From Appendix A and Appendix D.1 we see that P(2)E is expressed as
Pr[malE , good]
Pr[accept]
+ Pr[bad|accept] . (D.4)
The Pr[malE , good] term is expressed as a sum of the form
kmax∑
k=0
c(k)Γk (D.5)
where all of the coefficients c(k) are non-negative (because there are no XZ corrections) and it is
understood that Γ is a function of γ. The Pr[accept] term in the denominator is a product of terms
of the form
1−
kmax∑
k=0
c(k)Γk (D.6)
where, again, all c(k) are non-negative. Pr[bad|accept] is a sum of terms similar to (D.5), some of
which contain (D.6) terms in the denominator.
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Due to the strict fault-tolerance of our circuits, the coefficients c(k) of (D.5) and the numerator
coefficients of Pr[bad|accept] are zero for k ≤ 3. Therefore, for 0 ≤  ≤ 1, P(2)E (Γ) is a sum of
non-negative terms of the form∑kmax
k=0 c(k)(Γ)
k
1−∑kmaxk=0 c(k)(Γ)k ≤ 
4
∑kmax
k=4 c(k)Γ
k
1−∑kmaxk=0 c(k)Γk (D.7)
which completes the proof.
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